


The psychological contracts of temporary employees

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6116930

Master Thesis

Version 6

16 July 2012

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Msc Business Studies

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Abstract

More and more organizations employ temporary employees. The relationship between employer and employee is often investigated with psychological contracts by scholars (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Roehling, 1997; Rousseau, 1989; Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007). This study focuses on the psychological contracts temporaries have with both their agency-organization and their client-organization. The content of temporaries' psychological contracts is investigated, as well as the employee outcomes when psychological contract breach occurs. Thereby, an extended version of the theoretical model of Zhao et al. (2007) is tested for temporary employees. It is argued that breach of the psychological contract within one organization, does not only affect employee outcomes in that organization but also affects employee outcomes at the other organization (spillover effect). Furthermore, a new weighted measurement scale of breach is tested.

With the help of a cross-sectional design, 765 temporary employees of a large agency-organization in the Netherlands were questioned with a survey. Results suggest that the psychological contracts of temporary employees contain both transactional and relational elements and that these two contracts do not differ very much from each other. Analyses also show that psychological contract breach is influenced by temporaries' prospect on a renewed contract, volition and careerism. Results support the model of Zhao et al. for temporary employees and further show evidence for the spillover effect: psychological contract breach at one organization influences organizational/job satisfaction and intention to stay in the other organization. However, this relationship was not supported for the employee outcome organizational commitment.

1. Introduction

The employer-employee relationship is undergoing a change (Rousseau, 1990). More and more, organizations have to be flexible in order to stay competitive in the changing environment. Traditionally, organizations have tried to create a strong culture with stable employment and low turnover in exchange for loyal employees. This way of conducting employment management is seen as fundamental for other human resource (HR) practices because without offering employees some employment security, organizations cannot expect them to work hard and be committed (Marchington & Grugulis, 2000). However, in the competitive environment of today, organizations are seeking more flexibility and lower labor costs. Organizations now often try to fit the demands of the environment with the skills of their workforce. One way to accomplish this is by using contingent workers (Houseman, 2001). There are different options for an organization to fulfil a temporary vacancy (Houseman, 2001; McLean Parks, Kidder, & Gallagher, 1998). One of these options is to make use of temporary agency workers (temporaries). The use of temporaries by organizations is growing. In 2010, 18,5% of dependent employment¹ in The Netherlands comprised temporary employees, where this was 14% in 2000 (OECD, 2011).

Temporaries are employed by a temporary work agency (agency-organization) but report for work and are supervised by a client-organization (Connelly, Gallagher, & Webster, 2011). This makes temporaries different from regular employees of the client-organization. Temporaries have the opportunity to show positive and negative behavior towards two employers, the agency- and the client-organization, and these organizations may have conflicting interests (Benson, 1998). The agency-organization wants temporaries to work as many hours as possible while the client-organization wants temporaries to work as few hours as possible while generating maximal output. The competing interests of the agency- and client-organization can have an impact on temporaries' loyalty towards either one or both organizations.

Almost 15 years ago, Benson (1998) stated that it is not clear how temporaries perceive how employer-obligations are divided between the agency- and client-organization. Up till now, this is still not clear. For both the agency-organization and the client-organization it can be a competitive advantage to know on which employer-obligations they are being held responsible, because then these organizations can adjust their HR practices to the perceived needs of the temporary employee. Employees can for example expect their employer to provide training, a stimulating work-environment, salary, job-security, career development and challenging work. It is likely that temporaries' expectations towards the agency-organization differ from the expectations they have of the client-organization.


¹ Dependent employment includes occasional, casual, seasonal and daily workers (OECD, 2011).

A psychological contract refers to the beliefs of an individual about an exchange agreement between that individual and another party (Rousseau, 1989). The psychological contract is a widely used concept among scholars to measure the relationship between an employee and an employer (e.g. Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Roehling, 1997; Rousseau, 1989; Zhao, et al., 2007). Temporaries are thought to have two psychological contracts, one with the agency-organization and one with the client-organization, and either or both contracts can be breached. Psychological contracts can be more transactional in nature or more relational in nature (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1990). There is still no consensus among scholars about the nature of temporaries' psychological contracts (e.g. De Cuyper, Notelaers, & De Witte, 2007; Lapalme, Simard, & Tremblay, 2011; McDonald & Makin, 1999; Millward & Brewerton, 1999).

The psychological contract of employees is thought to be very important for the work attitudes and work behaviors of employees. Zhao et al. (2007) in their meta-analysis found that psychological contract breach has a significant impact on almost all investigated work-related outcomes. The work-related outcomes which they investigated were classified as affective reactions, work attitudes and work behaviors. The authors further investigated a causal chain from psychological contract breach through affective reactions and work attitudes to work behaviors (figure 1). The current investigation develops and tests a theoretical model of psychological contract breach of temporary employees. The hypothesized model of Zhao et al. acts as a base and is further extended with moderators which are hypothesized to affect the probability of temporaries' psychological contract breach. This model further investigates whether temporaries' work-related outcomes concern only the organization in which the breach occurred or if breach also spills over and affects the reactions of temporaries towards the other organization. In order to make the picture of temporaries' psychological contracts complete, this paper starts with an investigation of the content of the psychological contract of temporaries.

Figure 1: Hypothesized model of Zhao et al.

Model A. Full Mediation Model (Hypothesized)



Source: Adapted from Zhao et al. (2007, p. 655)

This paper sets out to make four contributions to the psychological contract literature. First, this study investigates the content of the two psychological contracts which temporaries are thought to hold. This gives agency- and client-organizations more insight in the psychological contracts of their

employees and gives them the possibility to better manage their employees' contracts so as to increase their employees' work-related outcomes. Second, this paper tests whether an extended version of the model of Zhao et al. (2007) applies to both psychological contracts of temporary employees. Third, this paper proposes that psychological contract breach at one organization affects temporaries' work-related outcomes at both organizations. This paper thereby investigates whether this spillover effect is positive or negative for the affiliated organization. This spillover effect has not been studied yet by other scholars. Fourth, the new weighted measurement scale of psychological contract breach of Revell (2012) is tested on its validity.

In this paper, the content of temporaries' psychological contracts is investigated in chapter 2. Chapter 3 further examines the effect that breach of the psychological contracts of temporaries might have and concludes with the theoretical model of this study. In the fourth chapter, the research method and measurement instruments are described. Chapter 5 presents the results of the set hypotheses which are further discussed in chapter 6. Chapter 6 also gives some managerial implications, describes the research strengths and limitations of this study and provides suggestions for further research. This study ends with some concluding remarks.

2. The psychological contract of temporaries

Temporaries have a relationship with both their agency-organization and their client-organization, and both organizations want their temporaries to perform well. Therefore, it can be important for these organizations to know how they can improve the relationship with their temporary employees. One way of doing this is by managing the psychological contracts of temporaries. In this chapter, the content of the two psychological contracts of temporaries is investigated. Paragraph 2.1 describes the background of the use of temporary employees by organizations. Paragraph 2.2 describes several pertinent theories of the psychological contract. Further, the content of the two psychological contracts of temporaries are investigated in paragraph 2.3. The last paragraph takes a closer look on four contextual factors that might influence the content of temporaries' psychological contracts.

2.1 The use of temporary employees

Miles and Snow (1984) name two types of strategies that may be employed by organizations to recruit and retain employees. The first strategy is the make-oriented strategy. This strategy recruits almost only entry-level employees. During the course of their employment, employees receive training and job-rotation to 'make' them fit in the desired function. Organizations with a 'make'-oriented strategy thus often try to have their employees stay with the organization for several years or more. The second strategy is the buy-oriented strategy. Organizations that are buy oriented recruit employees on all levels and functions. The organization recruits those people that are needed at any given time. One consequence of this is that the organization invests less in employees and employees can be fired when their skills are no longer needed. Careers of employees in a buy-oriented organization are thus less predictable, less structured and less safe than careers of employees in a make-oriented organization (Arnold, 2001).

Organizations with a buy-orientated strategy often make use of contingent workers (Millward & Brewerton, 1999). By making use of temporaries, organizations can quickly add or remove employees based on changing business conditions (Moorman & Harland, 2002). Agency-organizations can play different roles (Davidov, 2004). Traditionally they provide client-organizations with temporary employees for a short period of time. The temporary employees are employed by the agency-organization. The employment contract is often fixed term but can also be permanent. The agency determines which assignment the temporary employee gets at which client-organization and the client-organization determines the tasks and responsibilities of the temporary employee. Temporaries work only for a set time at one client-organization. After that, the agency-organization starts looking for a new job for the temporary employee to fulfill at another client-organization. Jobs

are matched with the knowledge, skills, abilities and career-wishes of the employees of the agency-organization.

2.2 The psychological contract

There is no complete consensus among scholars about the definition of the psychological contract (Roehling, 1997). The definition of Rousseau (1989), however, appears to be most widely accepted (Roehling, 1997). According to Rousseau (1989) the psychological contract refers to the beliefs of an individual about an exchange agreement between the individual and another party. This exchange agreement includes implicit obligations which are based on promises (e.g. service and loyalty) or factors which both parties take for granted (e.g. trust, fairness and good faith). A psychological contract is perceptual in nature, meaning that both parties of the exchange agreement can have different perceptions about their psychological contract with one another (Rousseau, 1990). A psychological contract is always held by an individual alone (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). The other party to which the contract refers, may have her own understanding of the psychological contract of the individual, she is however not an actual party to the contract. Psychological contracts can exist between an employee and employer but also between a student and his or her university or a customer and a manufacturer. In short, a psychological contract exists when an individual believes that he/she is obliged to behave in a certain way and the other party has certain obligations in return (Rousseau, 1990).

The concept of the psychological contract has its origins in the equilibrium theory of Barnard (1938). This theory states that organizations can motivate their employees to participate in the organization as long as the offered contributions for the employees are larger than the contributions the employee has to make. The equity theory of Adams (1963) has had a big impact on the psychological contract literature as well. This theory proposes that a person will always try to keep a balance between the input he or she brings to a job and the outcomes he or she receives by comparing this ratio to the ratio of referents. This means that people always want to be fairly treated as compared with relevant others. If the individual experiences that he or she is under- or over-rewarded in comparison to others, he or she will act on this to restore equity. For example, the individual can change his or her own input or outcomes, try to change the input or outcomes of the relevant other or leave the organization. The equity theory of Adams, the equilibrium theory of Barnard and the psychological contract, all three are based on the principle of balance (Morrison & Robinson, 1997).

A psychological contract between an employee and his or her employer emerges when an employee thinks that a contribution he/she makes towards the organization obligates the

organization to do something in return (Rousseau, 1989). This can also be reversed: a psychological contract arises when the organization makes a promise to the employee before the employee has made a contribution to the organization. Employees' expectations about organizational obligations derive from three sources (Turnley & Feldman, 1999a). First, agents of the organization (e.g. the employee's manager, HR-personnel, recruiters, top-management) can make explicit promises about what employees can expect from the organization. Also, promises can be made in a personnel-guide or other organizational documents. Second, an employee can form expectations more implicitly. By observing organizational culture, employees form expectations about how they will be treated and what they can expect in return. Third, the way in which people process information and idealize the organization is also a source of the psychological contract. For example, due to self-serving bias, an individual can come to believe that a certain task that he or she really likes belongs to his or her job. Either way, when the employee experiences that the organization is consistent in keeping promises, the employee will gain trust in the organization (Rousseau, 1989). The longer a relationship endures in which mutual contributions are made, "the more likely it is that the employee forms an unambiguous and consistent perception of his or her obligations and entitlements" (Rousseau, 1989, p. 125). It is thus likely that the longer an employee works for one organization, the stronger his or her belief in the existence of a psychological contract will be. Rousseau also argues that this belief increases when promises are more explicit.

A psychological contract can be more transactional or more relational in content (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1990). A more transactional contract involves specific mutual obligations for a short period of time which entail limited involvement on the part of both parties (e.g. payment). Transactional obligations are considered to be economic in nature and will not result in feelings of loyalty (McDonald & Makin, 1999). In contrast, a more relational contract involves open-ended and vague mutual obligations which are also based on socio-emotional elements (e.g. loyalty and job-security) (Rousseau, 1989). The two types of psychological contracts correspond with findings of Robinson and Morrison (1995). They made a distinction between implicit and explicit obligations. The more explicit an obligation, the more certain an employee will be that a psychological contract exists. Robinson and Morrison distinguished two factors with the help of a factor analysis. The first factor included obligations such as high pay, pay based on performance and promotion. They name these obligations explicit. The second factor included obligations such as job-security, career development and training. These are implicit obligations. Explicit obligations fall within the transactional psychological contract and implicit obligations within the relational psychological contract.

Rousseau (1989) proposes that the psychological contract exist on a continuum ranging from transactional to relational. Therefore, any psychological contract will contain transactional as well as relational elements (McDonald & Makin, 1999). Millward and Hopkins (1998) supported this

proposition by showing that the transactional psychological contract and the relational psychological contract are inversely correlated. The more transactional the psychological contract is, the less relational the psychological contract, and vice versa. This means that the psychological contract can be measured on a continuum.

2.3 Two psychological contracts for temporary employees

Temporary employees have a relationship with both their agency-organization as well as their current client-organization. The agency-organization provides salary and a selection of human resource services (Liden, Wayne, Kraimer, & Sparrowe, 2003). Temporaries will thus form a perception about their exchange relationship with the agency-organization. Although the client-organization will not directly pay the salary of temporaries, they will also offer a selection of human resource services to the temporary employee. Temporaries will thus form two psychological contracts, one with the agency-organization and one with the client-organization.

It has been argued that it is likely that temporaries have a transactional psychological contract with both the agency-organization and the client-organization (Lapalme, et al., 2011; Millward & Brewerton, 1999; Millward & Hopkins, 1998). The psychological contract with the agency-organization is transactional because of the limited communication between temporaries and the agency-organization. Communication only entails issues about payment or other employment-related issues. The psychological contract with the client-organization is likely to be transactional because employees will only stay with the client-organization for a limited period of time. Transactional psychological contracts typically evolve in a short period of time. It is therefore likely that the psychological contract of temporaries are more transactional than relational (De Cuyper, et al., 2007). Also, clients are probably less willing to invest in temporaries by offering training or coaching.

Although it is likely that the psychological contracts of temporaries are more transactional than relational in nature, several scholars have found that the psychological contract of temporaries on the client-organization can also be relational (McDonald & Makin, 1999; Millward & Brewerton, 1999). As a possible explanation for this, Pearce (1993) states that organizational membership alone does not lead to involvement but that there are also other factors that can make a psychological contract transactional or relational. Temporary employees are for example part of a team and face social pressures. Lapalme et al. (2011) further clarify this by arguing that temporaries feel more related to the client organization than the agency-organization because they have contact with the client-organization on a daily basis. Temporaries can thus feel like they are more part of the client-organization than they are part of the agency-organization. This paper therefore proposes that

temporaries' psychological contracts are more transactional than relational with the agency-organization and more relational than transactional with the client-organization.

Hypothesis 1a: *The psychological contract of temporaries with the agency-organization is more transactional than relational.*

Hypothesis 1b: *The psychological contract of temporaries with the client-organization is more relational than transactional.*

2.4 Contextual factors influence temporaries' psychological contracts

De Cuyper et al. (2007) name three possible factors which can make a psychological contract more relational in content: tenure, volition and contract prospect. Tenure refers to the time a temporary employee works in one organization. Volition refers to the preference of the temporary employee towards being temporarily employed. Finally, contract prospect refers to whether temporaries have the prospect of getting a renewed or permanent contract with an organization. Many scholars have investigated the effect of these three factors on the content of the psychological contract of temporaries (e.g. Lee & Faller, 2005; Millward & Hopkins, 1998; Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1994). Others found that careerism has an effect on the content of the psychological contract as well (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Careerism refers to the intention of an employee to stay working in the same job. Therefore, this paper takes the four contextual factors tenure, volition, contract prospect and careerism into account in studying the content of the psychological contracts of temporaries.

Tenure

Lee and Faller (2005) found that tenure in the client-organization influences the content of the psychological contract. Temporaries start with a transactional psychological contract with the client-organization but, over time, their psychological contract becomes more relational. Lee and Faller name the framework of Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni as a possible explanation for this finding. In a 2x2 matrix, Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni (1994) state that the content of a psychological contract is influenced by the time-frame of the contract and the specification of performance standards. The specification of performance standards refers to how clearly defined the employee's tasks and responsibilities are in the eyes of that employee. Lee and Faller (2005) argue that although temporaries may have a contract with a limited time frame, the specification of their work becomes more precise over time because temporaries become more integrated in the client-organization. De Cuyper et al. (2007) add to this argument that employees who stay longer in one organization gain

more privileges. Also, temporaries who see their contract with the client extended will expect that their contract will be extended into the future as well (Lee & Faller, 2005). Expectations of temporaries will thus grow over time which extends the content of the psychological contract with relational elements. Tenure will probably have the same effect on temporaries' psychological contract with the agency-organization. Druker and Stanworth (2004) investigated the expectations of the different parties of a temporary work agreement. They found that temporaries view the agency-organization more positively than the client-organization because their relationship with the agency-organization usually has a longer term. This finding supports the influence of tenure on the content of the psychological contract.

Volition

De Cuyper et al. (2007) name volition as another factor that influences the content of the psychological contract. Volition refers to the degree to which employees believe they have a choice in the permanence of the employment-relationship that they are in (McLean Parks, et al., 1998). Temporary workers who would rather be permanently employed score low on volition and temporary employees who prefer temporary employment score high on volition. For some people temporary employment is attractive and for others it is not. The sample of Feldman, Doeringhaus and Turnley's (1994) study consisted mainly out of individuals who would rather have a permanent job. According to these authors, more than fifty percent of temporary employees are trying to find a permanent job or trying to convert their temporary job into a permanent job and more than 75% of temporary employees do temporary work involuntarily.

Feldman et al. (2004) found that for most temporaries, temporary work was not a thing they would like to do for a long time. They found five key concerns of temporaries towards their jobs. First, temporaries often find that they are not treated personally and humanely on their job and are not treated as well as regular employees of the client organization. Second, temporaries do not have job security, and third, temporaries often receive poor fringe benefits. Fourth, temporaries state that their agency-organization often fails to provide a realistic job preview of the assignment within the client-organization. It comes across that temporaries are promised a permanent job by the agency but that this is seldom realized. Finally, temporaries often receive jobs for which they are overqualified and which are not challenging.

Most temps are doing temporary work because this suits their life at the moment or because their prospects for a permanent job are low (Feldman, et al., 1994). There are four groups of individuals who do find temporary jobs attractive: working mothers, students, peripheral workers and short-term unemployed. These groups like temporary work because of the variety it offers, its flexibility and its convenience. Also, some employees find temporary work attractive because it

allows them to improve their skills and abilities and to investigate different kind of jobs (Millward & Brewerton, 1999; Moorman & Harland, 2002).

De Cuyper et al. (2007) hypothesized that the more voluntarily a temporary conducts his or her work, the more transactional his or her psychological contract will be. However, they found no support for this hypothesis. The authors argued that voluntary temporaries find the more transactional elements of the psychological contract important, such as pay. Voluntary temporaries have deliberately chosen for temporary work. It is thus likely that they are not seeking relational entitlements. Many of them just want to be paid for the amount of work they have done. Involuntary temporaries on the other hand, find the more relational elements of the psychological contract important, such as job security and career development. Involuntary employees would rather have a permanent job. It is thus likely that their psychological contract matches the psychological contracts of permanent employees.

Contract prospect

De Cuyper et al. (2007) name the prospect of a renewed or permanent contract with an organization as the third factor which can influence the content of the psychological contract of temporaries. According to the 2x2 framework of Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni (1994), the time-frame of the contract influences whether a psychological contract is more transactional or more relational in nature. If a temporary employee has the prospect of a long-term relationship, he or she is likely to be more willing to invest in this relationship and also more likely to have more relational expectations of the organization. It is thus expected that these temporaries will extend their psychological contract with more relational elements such as job security and loyalty.

Careerism


Rousseau (1990) found that employees who are using their current job as a stepping stone for the next job, place less emphasis on the employment relationship than employees who intend to be with their organization for a longer time period. Robinson and Rousseau (1994) agree and state that careerism influences the nature of the psychological contract. Temporaries who score low on careerism want to stay with the organization for a longer time. Their psychological contract will probably entail relational elements. It is therefore likely that temporaries who score high on careerism have a more transactional psychological contract and that temporaries who score low on careerism have a more relational psychological contract.

It is proposed that the four contextual factors influence the content of the psychological contracts of temporaries at both the agency- and client-organization. This results in the following hypotheses which are visualized in figure 2:

Hypothesis 2a: The psychological contract of temporaries with the agency-organization will have more relational content as (i) agency tenure and (ii) agency contract prospect are higher, and (iii) volition and (iv) careerism are lower.

Hypothesis 2b: The psychological contract of temporaries with the client-organization will have more relational content as (i) agency tenure and (ii) agency contract prospect are higher, and (iii) volition and (iv) careerism are lower.

Figure 2: The continuum of psychological contracts of temporaries



3. Theoretical model

In the previous chapter it was stated that temporaries have two psychological contracts, one with the agency-organization and one with the client-organization. The content of these contracts can differ; they can be more transactional in nature or more relational in nature. It is further suggested that the nature of these contracts can be influenced by four contextual factors. Now that the content of the psychological contract has been discussed, it is time to take a closer look at the implications that breach of the psychological contracts of temporaries can have.

Zhao et al. (2007) found that psychological contract breach has a significant impact on (1) affective reactions of employees, (2) their work attitudes and (3) their work behaviors. Affective reactions refer to the emotional experiences which follow a workplace event. Work attitude is the employee's evaluation of the employer and the work in general. Work behaviors are employee's work related actions which have a tangible effect on the workplace. The authors further found that affective reactions mediate the relationship between breach and work attitudes and work behaviors.

In this paper it is examined whether the theoretical model of Zhao et al (2007) applies to the two psychological contracts of temporaries as well. The model of Zhao et al. is also extended with contextual factors which are thought to influence the probability of psychological contract breach of temporaries. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that psychological contract breach does not only affect work attitudes towards the referring organization; it is also hypothesized to 'spill over' and affect temporaries' work attitudes towards the other organization. The hypothesized model of this paper is further tested in light of four moderating variables. This paper does not investigate the work behaviors of temporaries because work behaviors cannot be measured correctly with a self-administered questionnaire. Figure 4 shows the theoretical model of this paper.

Paragraph 3.1 draws on several theories of the psychological contract literature to describe the difference between psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation. In the second paragraph four contextual factors will be proposed to influence the probability of breach of temporaries. The third paragraph further investigates if psychological contract breach can also be more transactional or relational in nature and hypothesizes that psychological contract content moderates the relation between psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation. In paragraph 3.4, the possible outcomes of breach are investigated and hypotheses are proposed for the spillover effect. Paragraph 3.5 examines possible moderators which may influence the relationships that are depicted in the theoretical model. The last paragraph makes some inferences about the used measurement scales of psychological contract breach.

3.1 Psychological contract breach and -violation

Scholars agree that the content of the psychological contract cannot easily be measured. It is argued that an individual is not aware of his or her psychological contract until the contract is breached or undergoing a change (McDonald & Makin, 1999). Therefore, the psychological contract in and of itself does not influence employee outcomes. Psychological contract breach occurs when the employee believes that what has been promised, does not correspond to what has been received (Rousseau, 1989). Only when psychological contract breach occurs the individual will become aware of the promises which are included in his or her psychological contract. Scholars thus tend to measure psychological contract breach or violation (Zhao, et al., 2007).


Breach refers to the cognition of an individual that his or her organization has failed to meet the obligations contained within the psychological contract (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989; Zhao, et al., 2007). It should be noted that it is the perception of broken promises rather than the actual breaking of promises that matters in psychological contract breach (Robinson, 1996). Psychological contract violation can follow after psychological contract breach. Violation refers to the emotional and affective state of the individual that arises from the perception of psychological contract breach (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Psychological contract violation can lead to anger and a changed view of the employee towards the organization (Rousseau, 1989).

An individual passes through several stages before breach and violation occur (Figure 3) (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Breach starts with renegeing and/or incongruence. Renegeing is when an organizational agent breaks a promise from the psychological contract and is aware of this. This can occur when the organization is unable or unwilling to fulfill the promise. Incongruence is when the agent and employee have a different understanding about a particular promise. In this scenario, the organization's agent might think that he or she has met a promise while the employee believes that this promise has not been kept. Also, an employee might perceive that a certain promise is broken while in reality this promise has never been made by the organization. When renegeing or incongruence occurs, it is up to the employee if he or she will actually perceive that a promise is unmet and thus whether a discrepancy is perceived. The salience of the discrepancy influences whether the employee will notice an unmet promise. Salience can be influenced by, for example, the importance and vividness of the promise to the employee and the size of the discrepancy. An employee's vigilance can also influence whether an employee perceives the promise to be unmet. Vigilance refers to the extent an employee keeps count on how well the organization generally fulfills the promises of his or her psychological contract. The next stage is a comparison process of the employee in which he or she compares how well both parties have fulfilled promises of the psychological contract. This comparison is made by the employee and is therefore likely to be

subjective and influenced by cognitive biases. When the employee perceives that the fulfillment of promises is unbalanced, psychological contract breach is thought to occur.

Morrison and Robinson (1997) state that violation sometimes follows breach when the employee interprets the breach in a negative way. The issues that could be taken into account by the employee include interpretations about how important unmet promises are for the employee, which implications the breach has, why the breach has occurred and how fair he or she has been treated (Morrison & Robinson, 1997).

Figure 3: The Development of Violation



Source: Adapted from Morrison and Robinson (1997, p. 232)

Parts of the model of Morrison and Robinson (1997) has been supported by findings of several scholars. Conway and Briner (2002) found that the importance of the promise to the relationship with the other party (which is part of the interpretation process (Morrison & Robinson, 1997)) is the most significant moderator of the relationship between breach and violation. Next, Turnley and Feldman (1999a) stated that the explicitness of an obligation (which affects saliency (Morrison & Robinson, 1997)) moderates the relationship between discrepancies of the psychological contract and violation. The more explicit a promise, the stronger the expectation of the individual is. This means that when a promise is implicit, it is more likely that the employee will think that he or she has misunderstood the promise when the obligation is not met. Furthermore, Robinson (1996) found that initial trust of the employee in his or her employer (which affects vigilance (Morrison & Robinson, 1997)) negatively influences the perception of breach. Robinson (1996) argues that individuals tend to focus on information which confirms their prior cognitions. When an individual's prior trust in his or her employer is low, it is likely that he or she will engage more in monitoring information behavior and thus perceive more incidents that lead to breach than when the individual's prior trust is high.

3.2 Contextual factors influence temporaries' psychological contract breach

The four contextual factors tenure, volition, contract prospect and careerism that were proposed in chapter 2 to influence the content of the psychological contracts of temporaries, will probably also have an effect on the chance that these contracts will be breached. This paper therefore takes these four contextual factors into account when studying psychological contract breach as well.

Tenure

It is likely that tenure negatively influences the probability of psychological contract breach of an employee. Bal, Cooman and Mol (2012) found that tenure influences the relationship between psychological contract fulfillment and work engagement and turnover intention. They state that employees with a long tenure know better what the organization expects from them and what they can expect in return from the organization. In contrast, employees with a short tenure have all kinds of expectations of the organization which are based on first impressions about the organization. In the first few years of employment, employees are constantly adjusting their expectations to reality. The longer the tenure of an employee, the more stable the employment relationship will be and the less probable that their psychological contract will be breached. Tenure is thus proposed to be negatively related to psychological contract breach.

Volition

Volition is likely to negatively influence the chance of psychological breach as well. If a temporary employee has chosen for temporary employment, he or she will likely have organization congruent expectations of the temporary job. He or she for example knows that the job is only for a certain period of time and is thus more likely to be fine with this than a temporary employee who would rather have a permanent job. If a temporary employee would rather have a permanent job, he or she will probably expect more from the organization than what the organization offers in reality. It is thus likely that the psychological contract of involuntary employees will get breached more easily.

Several scholars have already found direct effects of volition on temporaries' organizational attitudes and behavior (Benson, 1998; Bernhard-Oettel, De Cuyper, Berntson, & Isaksson, 2008; Connelly, et al., 2011; Ellingson, Gruys, & Sackett, 1998; Feldman, et al., 1994; Moorman & Harland, 2002). Kinnunen, Mäkikangas, Mauno, Siponen and Nätti (2011) hypothesized that volition influences the job performance of temporary employees but found this relationship to be not significant. This paper proposes that psychological contract breach mediates the relationship between volition and organizational outcomes.

Contract prospect

It is likely that contract prospect is negatively related to psychological contract breach. If a temporary employee has the prospect of a long-term relationship, he or she is more willing to invest in this relationship (De Cuyper, et al., 2007). Druker and Stanworth (2004) agree and argue that it is probable that temporaries who have the prospect of a longer-term assignment at the client-organization, are more likely to develop stronger linkages with the client-organization than temporaries who only have the prospect of a short-term assignment. Further, Morrison and Robinson (1997) stated that uncertainty increases an employee's vigilance which in turn increases the chance of breach. If an employee has the prospect on a renewed or permanent contract, his or her uncertainty will reduce which will lead to less vigilance and thus a decreased chance on breach. Therefore, it is likely that temporaries who have the prospect on a renewed or permanent contract perceive less breach of the psychological contract.

Careerism

Careerism is the last factor that is proposed to influence the probability of psychological contract breach. Employees who score high on careerism use their current job as a stepping stone for a better job (Rousseau, 1990). Therefore, employees who score high on careerism put less emphasis on their current employment relationship than employees who score low on careerism. Employees who score low on careerism want to stay with the organization for a longer time and thus tend to develop stronger linkages with the organization. It is therefore likely that temporaries who score low on careerism will also pay less attention on broken promises. This will decrease the chance on psychological contract breach.

It is therefore proposed that tenure, volition, contract prospect and careerism influence the probability of psychological contract breach of temporaries. These four predictors will influence as well the psychological contract of the agency-organization as the psychological contract of the client-organization because all factors influence the strength of the relationships temporaries have with both organizations and thus the likelihood of breach in both organizations. In the following hypotheses, the opposite measure of careerism, careerism^{-1} , will be used in order to set all hypothesized relations in the same direction. This results in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: (i) Agency tenure, (ii) volition, (iii) agency contract prospect and (iv) careerism^{-1} are negatively related to agency psychological contract breach.

Hypothesis 3b: (i) Client tenure, (ii) volition, (iii) client contract prospect and (iv) careerism^{-1} are negatively related to client psychological contract breach.

3.3 Transactional and relational psychological contract breach

In the second chapter of this paper, it was proposed that temporaries have a more transactional psychological contract with the agency-organization and a more relational psychological contract with the client-organization. Along similar lines, breach of the psychological contract can also be more transactional or more relational. Psychological contract breach is more transactional if breach is perceived on more transactional elements than relational elements and psychological contract breach is more relational when the reverse occurs (Lee & Faller, 2005).

The distinction between transactional and relational psychological contract breach has implications for employees' reactions towards this breach (Robinson & Morrison, 1995). Several authors found that that psychological contract breach is significantly related to violation (Raja, Johns, & Ntalianis, 2004; Zhao, et al., 2007). Zhao et al. (2007) further hypothesized that breach of the transactional content of the psychological contract has a more negative impact on employees' reaction than breach of the relational content. Zhao, et al. reasoned that transactional content is seen as a more basic obligation in an employee-employer relationship and that it is therefore very important to the employee. Relational content on the other hand is seen more as additional and harder for the employer to achieve. This makes it easier for employees to understand why relational obligations cannot always be met. However, due to the lack of primary studies which included both transactional and relational psychological contract breach, this hypothesis could not be investigated (Zhao, et al., 2007). The hypothesis of Zhao et al. matches the motivation-hygiene theory of Herzberg (1987). This theory suggests that the factors that lead to dissatisfied employees are not the same factors as the factors that lead to satisfied employees. Factors that can lead to dissatisfaction are extrinsic and can be found in the job environment of employees such as company policies, salary and security. Factors that can lead to satisfaction are intrinsic and can be found in the job content of employees such as recognition, the work itself and growth.

Interestingly, Morrison and Robinson (1997) hypothesize the opposite of Zhao et al. (2007) and argue that relational breach has a stronger relationship with violation than transactional breach. They state that a relational psychological contract has a stronger basis in the exchange relationship between employer and employee and therefore, breach of this type of contract will lead to more extreme reactions than breach of the transactional psychological contract. These competing hypotheses make this relationship interesting to investigate.

Differences in outcome between transactional and relational breach can be important for agency- and client-organizations. If these organizations want to prevent violation, it is important for them to know on which employer obligations they should focus. For example, if at the agency-organization transactional psychological contract breach has a stronger relationship with violation

than relational psychological contract breach, then the agency-organization should focus more on the fulfillment of transactional obligations than on relational obligations. If the same relationship applies for the client-organization, then the client-organization should also focus more on the fulfillment of transactional obligations than on relational obligations. Such knowledge is expected to give both the agency-organization and the client-organization insight in how to better manage the psychological contracts of temporaries. Because of contradictory findings in the literature, this paper investigates the following competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a: *Agency psychological contract breach is positively related to agency psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as agency psychological contract breach is more transactional.*

Hypothesis 4b: *Agency psychological contract breach is positively related to agency psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as agency psychological contract breach is more relational.*

Hypothesis 5a: *Client psychological contract breach is positively related to client psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as client psychological contract breach is more transactional.*

Hypothesis 5b: *Client psychological contract breach is positively related to client psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as client psychological contract breach is more relational.*

3.4 The spillover effect of temporaries' psychological contract breach

Zhao et al. (2007) found that psychological contract breach is significantly related to the work-attitudes of employees. Work attitudes are the employee's evaluation of the employer and the work in general. Turnley and Feldman (1999b) argue that control theory is very useful in understanding employees' reactions to psychological contract breach. Control theory states that employees adjust their attitudes and behaviors every time the employee perceives a discrepancy between what has been promised and what has been received. This means that when an employee perceives psychological contract breach, he or she will adjust his work attitudes and behaviors in order to regain balance.

Zhao et al. (2007) also found that violation mediates this relationship. Violation is frequently investigated by scholars as a mediator in the relationship between psychological contract breach and outcomes of breach (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Raja, et al., 2004; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Therefore, this paper investigates the mediating role of violation in the relationship between breach

and work attitudes. Zhao et al. (2007) name three components of work attitude: job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention. This paper also investigates these three components as outcomes of breach. Turnover intention is measured with the reversed variable intention to stay.

Job Satisfaction

Job satisfaction occurs when an employee perceives that what he or she is offered by the job equals what he or she wants from the job (Zhao, et al., 2007). Several authors found that psychological contract violation leads to dissatisfaction (Raja, et al., 2004; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Robinson and Rousseau (1994) explain that dissatisfaction occurs when there is a negative discrepancy between what the employee expected and received from the organization. Also, the promises that are not met can include aspects of a job that are sources for job satisfaction. When these promises are not met, the job satisfaction of an employee will also be negatively affected. It may thus be expected that psychological contract breach and job satisfaction are strongly negatively related.

Previous studies have investigated the effect of psychological contract breach on the job satisfaction of temporaries at the client-organization (Ellingson, et al., 1998; McDonald & Makin, 1999). However, scholars have not yet studied this effect at the agency-organization. It is likely that temporaries do not perceive job satisfaction at the agency-organization because they perform their job within the client-organization, not within the agency-organization. However, temporaries can be satisfied or not with the agency-organization. It is therefore proposed that breach at the agency is negatively related with the *organizational* satisfaction of temporaries.

Organizational Commitment

Organizational commitment refers to the way an individual identifies him- or herself with and is attached to the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1984). According to Meyer and Allen, commitment can stem from rational and economic motives or from emotional and affective motives. They identified three dimensions of commitment: affective, normative and continuance. Affective commitment arises when an employee wants to stay with the organization, normative commitment when an employee feels that he or she ought to stay with the organization, and continuance commitment arises when an employee needs to stay with the organization. Affective commitment is mostly selected by scholars researching the relationship of commitment to the psychological contract because the emotional and affective motives of an employee can be influenced by his or her psychological contract (Meyer & Allen, 1984; Zhao, et al., 2007).

According to Mowday, Porter and Steers (1983), affective motives arise when (1) an employee wants to stay part of the organization, (2) the employee believes in the organizational values and goals and/or (3) the employee is willing to put effort in the organization. It is likely that

employees who perceive psychological contract breach, score low on the above three components. For example, if an employee is angry with the organization and feels frustrated, he or she will likely feel less committed to the organization. Lester, Turnley, Bloodgood and Bolino (2002) also argue that commitment decreases after psychological contract breach. They state that commitment is part of the exchange relationship between the organization and an employee. When this exchange relationship is violated, it is likely that the employee tries to rebalance the relationship. This can be done by reducing one's commitment to the organization (Liden, et al., 2003; Turnley & Feldman, 1999b). These arguments are confirmed by findings of Raja et al. (2004), who found a negative relationship between psychological contract breach and organizational commitment. It is therefore proposed that psychological contract breach is negatively related to organizational commitment.

According to McDonald and Makin (1999), affective commitment is most related to the relational elements of the psychological contract. This means that if organizations want their employees to be committed to the organization, they need to engender a relational psychological contract with their employees. Millward and Hopkins (1998) confirm this hypothesis as they found that the more relational a psychological contract is, the higher the level of affective job commitment is. They also found that the more transactional a psychological contract is, the lower the level of affective job commitment.

Intention to stay

Intention to stay is the opposite of turnover intention. Turnover intention refers to the intention of an individual to leave the organization soon (Zhao, et al., 2007). The psychological contract is an instrument to bind the employee to the organization (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). When the psychological contract is violated, employees will lose faith in the organization and their feelings of equity will decrease (Turnley & Feldman, 1999b). Therefore, employees are more likely to wonder if the exchange agreement between themselves and the organization is still beneficial. Employees who experience psychological contract breach are thus more likely to have intention to leave the organization and less likely to have intention to stay (Zhao, et al., 2007). Raja et al. (2004) confirm these arguments by finding a positive relation between psychological contract breach and turnover intention.

It seems that psychological contract breach has an effect on all three components of work attitude. This led to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6a: Agency psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between agency psychological contract breach and (i) agency organizational satisfaction, (ii) agency organizational commitment and (iii) agency intention to stay.

Hypothesis 6b: Client psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between client psychological contract breach and (i) client job satisfaction, (ii) client organizational commitment and (iii) client intention to stay.

This paper proposes that psychological contract breach affects the work attitudes of the temporary employee towards both organizations. Temporaries have a relationship with both the agency-organization and the client-organization and it is likely that these relationships are interwoven. Temporaries' relationships with their two organizations are interwoven because both contracts refer to the same job of the same individual. Because of this interwovenness, it is suspected that when breach occurs in one organization, temporaries' work attitudes in both organizations can be affected. This paper refers to this phenomenon as the spillover effect.

There are competing theories about the spillover effect of temporaries' psychological contract breach. One theory of the spillover effect is that when psychological contract breach in one organization is low, both organizations will profit from the positive work attitudes of the temporary employee. McLean Parks et al. (1998) state that the performance of temporaries at the client organization can simultaneously fulfill objectives of the client organization and the agency-organization. For example, the better the performance of the temporary worker at the client-organization, the happier the client-organization will be with the temporary worker. However, the client-organization will also be happy with the agency-organization because they have sent a good employee and made a good match. McLean Parks et al. name this simultaneity a multiple agency relationship. Benson (1998) found support for the dual commitment of temporary employees. He found that the stronger the commitment of an employee toward the client-organization is, the stronger the commitment to the agency-organization, and vice versa. This correlation was not explained by one general factor of commitment. Liden et al. (2003) explain this relationship with a balance theory. They state that if a temporary employee is committed to the agency-organization and the agency-organization is committed to the client-organization, the employee will sense that he or she should also be committed to the client-organization in order to please the agency-organization. This relationship is supported by findings of Druker and Stanworth (2004). They found that one of the reasons for a temporary worker to stay with the client-organization is because he or she would otherwise let the agency down. Thus, when psychological contract breach in one of the organizations of the temporary employee is low, it will positively affect the employee's work attitude

in both organizations. Vice versa, if psychological contract breach in one organization is high, both organizations will suffer because of less favorable work attitudes of the temporary employee.

A competing theory is that when psychological contract breach in one organization is high, this will not only result in low work attitudes for the referring organization (hypotheses 6a and 6b) but also in high work attitudes for the other organization. Liden et al. (2003) found that temporaries who are least committed to the agency-organization will be most inclined to be positively committed to the client-organization. The authors give as explanation that because these employees are not happy with the agency-organization, they will probably try to get contracted directly with the client-organization. Therefore they show a lot of positive behavior towards the client-organization. Liden et al. argue as well that it is likely that the reversed relationship exists. Temporaries who are least committed to the client-organization will be most inclined to be positively committed to the agency-organization. A possible explanation is that these temporaries want to get transferred by the agency to a new client because they do not like the current client-organization. They therefore may focus their attention to the agency-organization. This led to the following competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 7a: Agency psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between agency psychological contract breach and (i) client job satisfaction, (ii) client organizational commitment and (iii) client intention to stay.

Hypothesis 7b: Agency psychological contract violation mediates the positive relationship between agency psychological contract breach and (i) client job satisfaction, (ii) client organizational commitment and (iii) client intention to stay.

Hypothesis 8a: Client psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between client psychological contract breach and (i) agency organizational satisfaction, (ii) agency organizational commitment and (iii) agency intention to stay.

Hypothesis 8b: Client psychological contract violation mediates the positive relationship between client psychological contract breach and (i) agency organizational satisfaction, (ii) agency organizational commitment and (iii) agency intention to stay.

3.5 Moderators

Zhao et al. (2007) suggested that future research of the psychological contract should also include individual differences such as personality. Turnley and Feldman (1999a) earlier stated that psychological contract violation will not always lead to a change in reactions of employees. Sometimes, there are factors which impede with employees from responding as expected (Turnley & Feldman, 1999b).

In their theoretical framework, Turnley and Feldman (1999a) propose that there are three factors which moderate the relationship between psychological contract violation and employee responses: (1) individual differences, (2) organizational practices and (3) labor market circumstances. First, an individual can have certain dispositional characteristics that may influence his or her reaction to breach. Individual differences include the employee's degree of affectivity, equity sensitivity and conscientiousness. Second, there can also be factors inside the organization which can make an employee react less intensely to psychological contract breach. Organizational practices include the perception of the individual about the procedural and interactional justice and remediation of the organization. It also includes the quality of working relationships that the individual has with his or her colleagues and supervisors. Last, there can also be circumstances in the labor market which may influence the reactions of an employee. Labor market circumstances include the exit costs for the employee, the degree of employee replaceability and the availability of attractive job alternatives for the employee.

In another study, Turnley and Feldman (1999b) tested three possible moderators of their earlier proposed theoretical model (Turnley & Feldman, 1999a) in the relationship between psychological contract violation and four outcomes, namely exit, voice, loyalty and neglect. The current investigation also investigates these three moderators in the relationship between breach and employee outcomes. The first moderator is the availability of attractive alternative employment. It is likely that if an employee can easily find another similar job, the employee will feel more free to react negatively to psychological contract breach because he or she is less scared to lose his or her job. Inversely, if an employee cannot easily find a similar job, he or she will want to stay with the organization and will therefore react less intensely to psychological contract breach. Availability of attractive alternative employment is thus a possible moderator that influences the reactions of employees to psychological contract breach. The second moderator is procedural justice. Procedural justice refers to whether individuals perceive that the decisions of the organization are made justly and fairly for all employees. If procedural justice is perceived as high, the employee will feel less personally offended when the promises that comprise the psychological contract cannot be met. Therefore, it is likely that procedural justice moderates the relationship between psychological contract breach and employee responses. The third moderator is justification for violation. Justification for violation is if employees perceive that the organization had to break the promises of the psychological contract because of external influences. External influences are for example changes in law or tax. It is likely that employees will react less intensely to psychological contract breach when they think that the organization could not help breaking its promises.

Turnley and Feldman (1999b) found that the three variables above only moderate the relationship between psychological contract violation and exit. They did not find a moderating effect

for the outcomes voice, loyalty and neglect. As a possible explanation for these findings, the authors pointed to fewer negative consequences for an employee to search for another job (exit) than to make complaints to management (voice) or to show negative behaviors at work (neglect). Job search occurs outside the workplace and out of sight of the organization while voice and neglect occurs inside the workplace (Turnley & Feldman, 1999b). Therefore, it is likely that voice, loyalty and neglect take place less often. The employee reactions of the present study (job attitude, organizational commitment and intention to stay) are reactions that also occur inside the head of the employee. It is thus possible that the three factors non-availability of attractive employment, procedural justice and justification for violation, do influence the relationship between psychological contract breach and employees' work attitudes in such a way that the higher these variables are, the less strong employees will react to psychological contract breach. It is therefore proposed that these variables have a moderating effect on both the hypothesized direct (agency-agency and client-client) and spillover (agency-client and client-agency) relationships because in all cases, the three situational variables can serve to weaken the reactions of employees. This led to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 9: *The situational variables (i) non-availability of attractive employment, (ii) procedural justice and (iii) justification for violation moderate all hypothesized relationships between psychological contract breach and employee work attitudes in such a way that these relationship will be weaker for employees who score high on these three variables.*

Several scholars have argued that the personality of an employee influences psychological contract processes (Orvis, Dudley, & Cortina, 2008; Raja, et al., 2004; Tallman & Bruning, 2008; Turnley & Feldman, 1999a). The psychological contract is constructed by an individual. The personality of the individual will thus likely influence the formation of the psychological contract and the chance of psychological contract breach (Raja, et al., 2004). Personality is often measured with the personality characteristics of the big five: neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience and conscientiousness (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Conscientiousness is found to be the most important predictor out of the big 5 personality dimensions in the prediction of organizational behavior (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Therefore, the present study takes conscientiousness into account when studying the psychological contract of temporaries.

Conscientiousness says something about how an individual conducts his or her work (e.g. if he or she is dependable, works hard, is goal-directed and risk-averse (McCrae & Costa, 1987)). Employees who score high on conscientiousness tend to work hard and perform well in every working condition (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Therefore, Turnley and Feldman (1999a) argue that it is likely that individuals who score high on conscientiousness are more likely to continue working hard,

even when their psychological contract is violated. This statement is supported by findings of Orvis et al. (2008) who found that conscientiousness significantly negatively moderates the relationship between psychological contract breach and organizational loyalty, job satisfaction and turnover intention. Current investigation also hypothesizes that employees who score high on conscientiousness will react less intensely than employees who score lower on conscientiousness when psychological contract breach occurs. This led to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 10: *Conscientiousness moderates all hypothesized relationships between psychological contract breach and employee work attitudes in such a way that these relationships will be weaker for employees who score high on conscientiousness.*

3.6 Measures of breach

There are three different ways in which psychological contract breach can be measured: by means of a composite measure, a global measure and a weighted measure (Zhao, et al., 2007). The composite measure assumes that the psychological contract can be measured on several components (e.g. pay, job security, training, etc). Breach is assessed by asking respondents how much the organization has fulfilled its obligations of each component. The global measure does not ask respondents to rate the components but rather asks respondents about their overall view on the fulfillment of obligations at the organization. The third way to measure breach is the weighted measure. Weighted measures ask respondents to rate as well the fulfillment as the relative importance of several components of the psychological contract. The fulfillment- and importance scores are multiplied and averaged to yield a weighted breach score (Zhao, et al., 2007).

The components which are used in the composite and weighted measure can be categorized into transactional components and relational components (Zhao, et al., 2007). Thus, to measure if a psychological contract is transactional or relational, one of these measurement instruments have to be used. McLean Parks et al. (1998) believe that the composite measure is not appropriate to use for temporaries because not all temporaries will perceive the same set of obligations that form their psychological contract. Therefore, the present research employed a weighted measure by asking respondents to indicate for each component whether the organization is obligated to fulfill the component or not. Also, a measure of global breach was used in order to make comparisons between these two measurement approaches.

Zhao et al (2007) hypothesized that breach measured by a global approach has a stronger relationship with work outcomes than breach measured by a composite approach. They followed arguments of McLean Parks et al. (1998) who stated that it is difficult to completely measure the

content of the psychological contract using a composite measurement scale because every individual has its own unique contract. Breach measured by a composite approach assumes that every individual's psychological contract has the same content. It is therefore likely that a standardized measurement scale does not accurately reflect the entire psychological contract of an employee. Because the composite measure does not measure psychological contract breach entirely, Zhao et al. (2007) hypothesized that these measures do also make less accurate predictions of work outcomes.


Current investigation proposes that the weighted measure of psychological contract breach even has a stronger relationship with work outcomes than the global measure of breach. It is argued that the weighted measure of breach is the most accurate out of the three measures of breach because this measure is the only one that can make a distinct measure for each individual respondent. Since the weighted measure asks respondents to the relative importance of each term of the psychological contract, the total breach score will not comprise irrelevant terms of the psychological contract. Therefore, the weighted measure of breach does best meet the requirement to measure only unmet promises of the psychological contract. In contrast, the global measure of breach does ask respondents to the fulfillment of promises in general and does not at all take into account that psychological contract breach only entails the unmet promises. Therefore, current investigation proposes that the weighted measure of breach is a better measure than the global measure of breach which results in stronger relationships with work outcomes for the weighted measure of breach than the global measure. This led to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 11a: Agency psychological contract breach measured by a weighted approach has a stronger relationship with (i) agency psychological contract violation, (ii) agency organizational satisfaction, (iii) agency organizational commitment and (iv) agency intention to stay, than breach measured by a global approach.

Hypothesis 11b: Client psychological contract breach measured by a weighted approach has a stronger relationship with (i) client psychological contract violation, (ii) client job satisfaction, (iii) client organizational commitment and (iv) client intention to stay, than breach measured by a global approach.

Figure 4 shows the theoretical framework of this research paper. The next section of this paper describes the used research method which is used to test the set hypotheses.

Figure 4: Theoretical framework



4. Method

In chapter 2 and 3 of this paper, hypotheses were set for the psychological contracts of temporary employees. In this chapter, the used research method is described. Paragraph 4.1 of this chapter describes the sample and data-collection procedure of the present study. The second paragraph describes the measurement scales that were used in the survey.

4.1 Sample and procedure

The sampling frame of the present research consists of persons who work as temporary employees. The data was gathered with a self-administered questionnaire which was developed by a research team of the HRM-OB group of the University of Amsterdam. Most of the items used to measure the various constructs in the questionnaire were obtained from previous studies of other scholars. Therefore, the questionnaire was first drafted in English. Ten respondents pre-tested this English language questionnaire. On the basis of the feedback obtained in this pilot, the questionnaire was revised by removing some constructs. Subsequently, the questionnaire was translated into Dutch following procedures of Brislin (1970): first, one member of the research team translated all items from English to Dutch. Then, another member of the research team translated those items back to English. After comparison of the original item with the translated English item, the two researchers discussed and resolved differences between the two versions of an item. The questionnaire was sent out by e-mail and responses were administered electronically.

The sample consists of temporary employees who work for a large Dutch agency-organization. This organization is one of the biggest organizations that employs and supplies temporary employees in the world. Employees of the agency-organization are employed in all industries which makes this organization a representative organization to collect data for this study.

Questionnaires were sent to employees who met five conditions. The five conditions are as follows: employees should (1) be traditional temporaries who work for a client-organization and not temporaries who work on payroll, (2) have a unique mail address, (3) have an educational level of higher vocational educational or higher, (4) currently work and (5) have opted in to receiving emails from the agency-organization. In this way, the research team wanted to make sure that those persons were approached who were able to understand the questions of the questionnaire. A total of 7.821 employees of the agency-organization matched this profile and formed the target group of present study.

Respondents were informed that the questionnaire was concerned with what employees expect of the two organizations that they work for. Employees were also informed that results of the present study would be used to improve the employee services of the agency-organization. One IPAD 3 was allotted among the respondents who completed the questionnaire and responses were handled confidentially. From the target group of 7.821 employees, e-mails were sent to 7.707 persons. E-mails could not be delivered to 114 persons because of expired or duplicate mail addresses. Further, 22 questionnaire invitations bounced, which resulted in 7.685 successful e-mail invitations. A total of 1957 employees opened and started filling in the questionnaire (response rate = 25.47%) of which 828 employees filled in the questionnaire completely (response rate 10.77%). Respondents were excluded when they (1) did not answer all questions of more than one construct or (2) gave the same answers on all questions of constructs that included reverse scaled items. In this way, respondents were filtered out who did not fill in the questionnaire seriously. A total of 63 respondents were excluded which resulted in a net sample of 765 respondents (response rate = 9.95%). The large number of drop-outs can be explained by the length of the questionnaire. Respondents took on average 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Therefore, the response rate is satisfactory.

The sample comprised 44.3% male employees, ranging in age from 18 to 67 years old ($M = 33.3$; $SD = 12.2$). Of all respondents, 50% of employees are between age 24 and 39 which makes the age distribution positively skewed. Respondents were highly educated, 75.1% have finished higher vocational educational or university. Respondents were working in a variety of jobs with most respondents working in the sectors government (15.3%), administration (14.6%) and social services (11%). The average scope of respondents' contracts is 24.82 hours ($SD = 14.08$) with 50% of employees having a contract between 13 and 37 hours. Respondents' reported overtime per week ranged from -12 (undertime) to +14 hours with a mean of 2 ($SD = 5.9$) and an interquartile range between 0 and 2. A total of 94 respondents (12.3%) reported to have a permanent contract with the agency-organization.

4.2 Measurement instruments

In this paragraph, the used measurement instruments are described. Unless otherwise specified, the following construct were measured twice, once for the agency-organization and once for the client-organization. Questions were worded in such a way that it was clear for the respondent to which of the two organizations the item referred. Also, a five-point likert-scale was used ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Items were averaged to form a scale.

Psychological contract breach

Weighted psychological contract breach was assessed using 55 items from Revell (2012) (appendix 1). She explored the psychological contract in a qualitative inductive study. Because psychological contracts are based on perceptions of individuals, the content of psychological contracts can be very different between people. There is still no consensus among scholars about the obligations that form a psychological contract (Herriot, Manning, & Kidd, 1997). Therefore, Revell (2012) analyzed 108 interviews in which Dutch employees were asked about employer and employee obligations. Items were constructed on the basis of quotes from interviewees. Her scale distinguishes 13 employer obligations of the psychological contract, with 9 of these dimensions matching the inductively derived measurement scale of Herriot et al. (1997). The measured employer dimensions are: training (e.g. Provides the opportunity to follow training and/or courses), consult (e.g. Provides feedback on a continuous basis), discretion (e.g. Provides freedom in how I perform my work), humanity (e.g. Provides a caring environment), recognition (e.g. Takes my opinion into account), environment (e.g. Provides facilities to do my job), justice (e.g. Follows up on agreements that have been made), pay (e.g. Pays a fair amount of salary in exchange for my expertise), security (e.g. Provides job security), career development (e.g. Offers alternative employment in case I am let go), challenging work (e.g. Provides challenging work assignments), flexibility (e.g. Provides flexibility in working hours) and openness (e.g. Provides role clarity).

Psychological contract breach for the agency-organization and the client-organization were measured separately. Per organization, for each item respondents were asked to answer two questions which per organization were put together on one page of the questionnaire. The first question is if the respondent thinks that the organization is obligated to fulfill the term in question. Respondents could answer this question with not obligated, neutral and obligated (coded as 0, 1 and 2). For the second question, each term was stated as if the organization is fulfilling the term. Respondents were asked to rate to what extent they agreed with the statement. A five-point likert-scale was used ranging from 5 = strongly disagree to 1 = strongly agree. Per item, breach was ascertained by multiplying the obligation score with the fulfillment score and dividing it by two. Breach of each items could thus range from 0 (no breach) to 5 (total breach). Psychological contract breach was calculated by averaging all breach scores of the 55 items.

Global psychological contract breach was also measured in order to examine the weighted measure scale of Revell. Five items obtained from Robinson and Morrison (2000) were used (e.g. Almost all the promises made by my *employment agency/current company* during recruitment have been kept so far). Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the five statements.

Transactional and relational psychological contract breach

To measure if the psychological contract breach is more transactional or more relational, all 55 items of Revell (2012) were independently rated by four persons of the research team as to whether they were transactional or relational. An inter-rater reliability analysis using the intraclass correlation was performed to determine consistency among raters. The average measure for the raters was found to be ICC = .635 ($p < .01$). Items that were not unanimously classified as being transactional or relational were classified in the factor that had the most votes of the research group. Appendix 1 shows which items are rated as transactional and which items are rated as relational.

The two components of psychological contract breach were assessed separately for both the agency-organization and the client-organization. Transactional psychological contract breach was measured by averaging the psychological contract breach-scores of all transactional items and relational psychological contract breach was measured by doing this for all relational items. Psychological contract breach was considered to be more transactional when the score for transactional psychological contract breach was higher than the score for relational psychological contract breach. Vice versa, psychological contract breach was considered to be more relational when the opposite occurred.

Psychological contract content

To measure if the content of the psychological contract is more transactional or relational, two scores were computed based on the inter-rater classification of the items of weighted breach. The transactional psychological contract was measured by averaging the obligation scores of all transactional items and the relational psychological contract was measured in the same way but then for all relational items. The psychological contract was considered to be more transactional when the score for transactional psychological contract is higher than the score for relational psychological contract. Vice versa, the psychological contract was considered to be more relational when the opposite occurred.

Tenure

Tenure was measured with one question (How long have you been working for the *employment agency/the current company* you are working for? Respondents could answer this question by indicating the number of years and months they had been working for each organization.

Volition

Volition was measured only once with one item from Ellingson et al. (1998), namely "Would you prefer permanent work over temporary work if it was available?" (reverse scored).

Contract prospect

Contract prospect was measured three times: two times for the agency-organization and one time for the client-organization. Respondents were first asked if they already had a permanent contract with the agency-organization. If not, they were asked to rate their prospect on a renewed contract with the agency-organization (Do you have the prospect on a renewed contract at the employment agency?). Respondents were then asked to rate their prospect on a permanent contract with the agency-organization. Next, they were asked to rate their prospect on a renewed contract with the client-organization. Respondents could answer these questions with yes, no, and do not know.

The three items of contract prospect were recoded as follow: Agency renewed/permanent contract prospect was coded as 0 if the respondent indicated that he or she did not have the prospect on a renewed/permanent contract, coded as 1 if the respondent did not know whether he or she had the prospect on a renewed/permanent contract, coded as 2 if the respondent did had the prospect on a renewed/permanent contract and coded as 3 if the respondent already had a permanent contract. Client renewed contract prospect was coded in the same way only code 3 was left out because it is not possible for temporary employees to have a permanent contract with the client organization.

Careerism

Careerism was measured only once with five items from Robinson and Rousseau (1994). Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statements (e.g. I took this job as a stepping stone to a better job with another organization).

Psychological contract Violation

Psychological contract violation was measured with four items from Robinson and Morrison (2000). Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the four statements (e.g. I feel a great deal of anger toward my *employment agency/current organization*).

Organizational/Job satisfaction

Organizational- and Job satisfaction were measured with three items obtained from Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins and Klesh (1983). Questions were worded in such a way that it was clear for the respondent: (1) to which of the two organizations it referred and (2) if the item referred to organizational- or job satisfaction. Organizational satisfaction was measured for the agency-organization (e.g. In general, I am satisfied with my employment agency) and job satisfaction was measured for the client-organization (e.g. In general, I am satisfied with my job).

Organizational commitment

Organizational commitment was measured with six items from Meyer, Allen and Smith (1993). Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the six items (e.g. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with the *employment agency/this current organization*).

Intention to stay

Intention to stay was measured with four items which were adopted from Kelloway, Gottlieb and Barham (1999) to measure turnover intention. The items were reverse scored in order to measure intention to stay. Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the four items (e.g. I am thinking about leaving the *employment agency/the current organization*).

Situational factors

The three situational factors were measured with six items from Turnley and Feldman (1999b). Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the questions. The four items to measure availability of attractive job alternatives were reverse scored to measure non-availability of attractive job alternatives (e.g. If I were to leave my *employment agency/current organization*, it would be difficult to find a job that is just as good). One item was used to measure external justification (Forces outside my *employment agency's/current organization's* control (such as general economic conditions, government regulations, or mergers) caused my *employment agency/organization* to change the commitments it made to me). One item was used to measure fairness of procedures (Procedures my *employment agency/current organization* uses for making decisions about layoffs and terminations are fair).

Conscientiousness

Conscientiousness was measured only once with the revised version of the NEO personality inventory which was obtained from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP, 2012). Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with ten items (e.g. I am always prepared).

Control variables

Several control variables were included in the correlation matrix (table 3). These control variables were gender, age, marital status, educational degree (ranging from high school to PhD), contract hours, the difference between actual worked hours and contract hours, gross yearly salary (ranging from 'minimal' to 'two times more than average') and total work experience (in years). These variables were included because it is possible that they influence the state of the psychological contract of an employee.

5. Results

In this chapter, the conducted analyses and associated results that test the hypotheses of this study are described. In the first paragraph, the data of the present study are investigated with the help of correlations. The second paragraph shows the results pertaining to each of the hypotheses.

5.1 Investigation of the data

Descriptive statistics, correlations and reliabilities of the variables of the theoretical model are given in table 3. Correlations greater or equal to .06 are significant at the 95% level and correlations greater or equal to .09 are significant at the 99% level. Reliabilities of all used constructs could not have been improved by removing one or more of the items. 'Cronbach's alpha if item deleted' did not exceed the cronbachs alpha with more than .1 for all constructs.

After investigating the correlation matrix, marital status and overtime were excluded as control variables in further analyses because they exhibited low correlations with the variables of the theoretical model. The total measure of weighted psychological contract breach exhibited a large correlation with global breach with a correlation of $r = .49$ ($p < .01$) for agency psychological contract breach and a correlation of $r = .48$ ($p < .01$) for client psychological contract breach (table 3). These results indicate that the two used measures of breach do not exactly measure the same construct. Therefore, both measures of breach were used when testing the relationships of the theoretical model.

Two additional correlations were computed in order to investigate the transactional and relational psychological contract content and the transactional and relational psychological contract breach (table 1 and table 2). It turned out that the reliability of the relational factor of psychological contract is very high: with $\alpha = .91/.94$ for agency content/breach and $\alpha = .94/.95$ for client content/breach. The reliability of the transactional factor is a bit lower with $\alpha = .71/.79$ for agency content/breach and $\alpha = .77/.83$ for client content/breach. This difference can be explained by the high number of items that formed the relational scale of the psychological contract (Number of items = 42) and the smaller number of items that formed the transactional scale of the psychological contract (Number of items = 13). The reliability of the transactional scale is high enough to assume that the items of this factor measure the same construct.

Contrary to expectations, transactional psychological contract breach/content and relational psychological contract breach/content are not negatively correlated for both the agency psychological contract and the client psychological contract ($r = \{.75; .76; .83; .83\}$). The more transactional items the psychological contract included, the more relational items it also included,

and vice versa. This implies that the psychological contract does not exist on a continuum ranging from transactional to relational, but rather that it can contain both transactional and relational elements. These findings are supported by a factor-analysis of Revell's 55 items of the psychological contract. Factor analysis reveals that there are in fact 12 factors (EV > 1; cumulative percentage of explained variance > 60%) underlying the 55 items of breach instead of two. Calculating a fixed number of factors of 2 did not reveal two factors that match the theoretical descriptions of transactional and relational psychological contract breach.

Table 1: correlations transactional – relational pc content

	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4
1 Agency transactional psychological contract	1.59	0.28	(.71)			
2 Agency relational psychological contract	1.37	0.31	.76	(.91)		
3 Client transactional psychological contract	1.68	0.29	.53	.52	(.77)	
4 Client relational psychological contract	1.44	0.36	.46	.64	.75	(.94)

Notes: n = 765 ; alpha reliabilities are given in parentheses; for correlations greater or equal to .06, p < .05; for correlations greater or equal to .09, p < .01.

Table 2: correlations transactional – relational pc breach

	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4
1 Agency transactional psychological contract breach	3.62	1.38	(.79)			
2 Agency relational psychological contract breach	3.36	1.40	.83	(.94)		
3 Client transactional psychological contract breach	3.63	1.42	.60	.53	(.83)	
4 Client relational psychological contract breach	3.29	1.45	.55	.60	.83	(.95)

Notes: n = 765 ; alpha reliabilities are given in parentheses; for correlations greater or equal to .06, p < .05; for correlations greater or equal to .09, p < .01.

Table 3: Correlation matrix

	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34			
1 Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	-	-	(-)																																				
2 Age	33.30	12.19	-.07	(-)																																			
3 Marital status	1.76	0.89	.04	.56	(-)																																		
4 Education	6.73	1.24	.13	-.01	-.03	(-)																																	
5 Contract hours	24.82	14.08	-.01	-.13	-.02	.13	(-)																																
6 Overtime	2.01	5.90	-.01	.01	-.04	-.03	-.40	(-)																															
7 Bruto yearly salary	2.18	0.91	-.09	.24	.20	.13	.49	-.04	(-)																														
8 Total work experience	11.51	11.02	-.07	.93	.51	-.10	-.19	.04	.19	(-)																													
9 Agency tenure	1.81	2.41	-.01	.26	.14	-.01	-.13	.04	.04	.28	(-)																												
10 Client tenure	1.45	2.51	-.06	.25	.21	-.07	-.17	.05	.08	.25	.36	(-)																											
11 Volition	1.82	1.13	-.03	.29	.14	.03	-.17	.07	.05	.30	.20	.10	(-)																										
12 Agency renewed contract prospect	1.33	0.93	-.06	.12	.05	-.07	-.04	-.03	.03	.14	.30	.18	.08	(-)																									
13 Agency permanent contract prospect	0.88	0.95	-.04	.08	-.02	-.11	-.09	.02	.00	.13	.27	.14	.06	.68	(-)																								
14 Client renewed contract prospect	1.14	0.81	-.06	-.09	-.05	-.04	.07	.01	.04	-.04	-.01	.01	-.08	.35	.16	(-)																							
15 Careerism	3.31	0.74	-.05	-.23	-.14	.19	.02	.04	-.03	-.26	-.08	-.15	.17	-.07	-.12	-.03	(.54)																						
16 Agency psychological contract breach	1.67	0.66	.09	-.13	-.03	.09	.08	.00	-.02	-.11	.00	-.05	-.14	-.09	-.10	-.08	.12	(.95)																					
17 Agency global psychological contract breach	1.85	0.89	-.02	-.08	-.04	-.02	.03	-.03	-.01	-.05	.08	-.01	-.01	-.09	-.05	-.08	.01	.49	(.89)																				
18 Client psychological contract breach	1.69	0.70	.03	-.16	-.06	.06	.11	-.04	-.06	-.16	-.04	-.02	-.14	-.16	-.16	-.12	.14	.61	.28	(.96)																			
19 Client global psychological contract breach	2.01	0.97	-.03	.00	.03	-.02	.10	-.08	.08	-.02	.02	.01	.05	-.09	-.09	-.19	.05	.29	.48	.48	(.90)																		
20 Agency psychological contract violation	1.40	0.78	-.07	-.08	-.05	.02	.04	-.04	-.07	-.09	.06	.02	-.04	-.08	-.11	-.09	.08	.41	.64	.23	.30	(.90)																	
21 Client psychological contract violation	1.58	0.87	-.06	-.05	-.01	.04	.16	-.12	.06	-.08	.01	.02	-.02	-.14	-.14	-.16	.08	.28	.34	.47	.65	.45	(.89)																
22 Agency non-availability of attractive employment alternatives	2.73	0.81	.00	.10	.07	-.07	.03	-.05	.05	.07	.11	.10	-.05	.10	.12	.08	-.17	-.13	-.11	-.07	-.09	-.07	-.03	(.66)															
23 Client non-availability of attractive employment alternatives	2.85	0.91	-.01	.09	.07	-.06	.05	-.03	.05	.07	.07	.12	-.07	.14	.14	.13	-.20	-.06	-.03	-.13	-.13	-.04	-.07	.70	(.76)														
24 Agency justification for violation	3.20	1.03	.03	.17	.10	-.02	.01	-.02	.06	.14	.06	.06	.07	.09	.06	-.01	-.07	-.26	-.26	-.18	-.15	-.22	-.13	.12	.09	(-)													
25 Client justification for violation	3.16	1.15	.07	.11	.08	.04	.01	-.01	.07	.11	.06	.03	.02	.14	.14	.06	-.06	-.14	-.11	-.25	-.26	-.07	-.28	.10	.15	.35	(-)												
26 Agency procedural justice	3.34	0.88	-.01	.06	.04	.03	-.01	.01	.01	.07	-.03	.00	.01	.04	.01	-.01	-.01	-.30	-.30	-.26	-.23	-.24	-.18	.06	.03	.29	.15	(-)											
27 Client procedural justice	3.15	1.09	-.01	.08	.03	.02	-.03	.01	.04	.08	-.04	.03	-.04	.08	.07	.08	-.06	-.18	-.16	-.33	-.35	-.14	-.37	.02	.09	.18	.30	.31	(-)										
28 Conscientiousness	4.12	0.51	.17	.14	.12	-.03	-.02	.05	.06	.16	-.01	-.02	-.09	.07	.06	.08	-.17	-.06	-.20	-.11	-.22	-.21	-.23	-.04	.00	.05	.10	.12	.13	(.76)									
29 Agency organizational satisfaction	4.08	0.91	.04	.14	.07	-.06	-.08	-.01	.02	.14	.01	.01	.14	.09	.10	.06	-.13	-.46	-.57	-.29	-.27	-.72	-.36	.13	.06	.24	.12	.32	.18	.21	(.79)								
30 Agency organizational commitment	2.45	0.83	-.01	.25	.08	-.12	-.07	.02	.01	.26	.17	.09	.15	.16	.18	.00	-.23	-.31	-.27	-.18	-.11	-.27	-.11	.17	.08	.21	.13	.21	.08	.16	.50	(.76)							
31 Agency intention to stay	3.30	1.06	.01	.16	.08	-.19	-.20	.03	-.06	.21	.12	.09	.18	.26	.25	.18	-.29	-.36	-.31	-.31	-.30	-.42	-.34	.19	.20	.08	.11	.09	.09	.21	.51	.44	(.79)						
32 Client job satisfaction	4.12	0.94	.02	.10	.08	-.13	-.10	.09	.07	.15	.04	.08	.05	.17	.17	.21	-.21	-.26	-.22	-.43	-.44	-.31	-.54	.15	.22	.08	.26	.17	.24	.31	.40	.20	.47	(.86)					
33 Client organizational commitment	3.09	0.90	.02	.10	.08	-.09	.06	.06	.16	.08	.04	.07	-.02	.16	.16	.20	-.29	-.16	-.09	-.32	-.32	-.10	-.30	.21	.33	.09	.29	.09	.22	.23	.20	.25	.32	.59	(.79)				
34 Client intention to stay	3.22	1.22	-.03	.19	.09	-.17	-.16	.05	.00	.23	.10	.10	.11	.25	.26	.25	-.33	-.27	-.15	-.40	-.36	-.22	-.42	.17	.27	.06	.19	.05	.18	.24	.31	.29	.75	.62	.54	(.89)			

Notes: n = 765 ; alpha reliabilities are given in parentheses; for correlations greater or equal to .06, p < .05; for correlations greater or equal to .09, p < .01.

5.2 Hypothesis testing

In this paragraph, the hypotheses of present study are tested. Hypotheses were tested with correlations, a t-test or regression analyses. Mediation and moderation analyses were conducted using Hayes' computational tool PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 2012a). PROCESS can easily calculate the different pathways that exist in theoretical models that include mediated and moderated relations, or a combination of both. PROCESS includes a set of 74 different models that can be selected to investigate different types of theoretical relationships (Hayes, 2012b).

Hypothesis 1a: *The psychological contract of temporaries with the agency-organization is more transactional than relational.*

Hypothesis 1b: *The psychological contract of temporaries with the client-organization is more relational than transactional.*

Two new variables to measure psychological contract content were formed to test hypotheses 1 and 2, one for the psychological contract temporaries have with the agency and one for the psychological contract temporaries have with the client. These two variables were calculated by subtracting the transactional psychological contract variable from the relational psychological contract variable. By doing this, a negative score on psychological contract content means that the psychological contract contains more transactional than relational elements. A positive score on psychological contract content means that there are more relational than transactional elements in the psychological contract.

A t-test was conducted in order to investigate hypothesis 1a and 1b. There was a significant effect for the agency's psychological contract content ($t(764) = -29.09, p < .01$). The mean of $-.222$ indicates that the psychological contract temporaries have with the agency, includes relatively more transactional than relational elements. There was also a significant effect for the client's psychological contract content ($t(764) = -28.44, p < .01$). The mean of $-.243$ indicates that the psychological contract temporaries have with the client includes as well relatively more transactional than relational elements. These results support hypothesis 1a and do not support hypothesis 1b.

Hypothesis 2a: *The psychological contract of temporaries with the agency-organization will have more relational content as (i) agency tenure and (ii) agency contract prospect are higher, and (iii) volition and (iv) careerism are lower.*

Hypothesis 2b: *The psychological contract of temporaries with the client-organization will have more relational content as (i) agency tenure and (ii) agency contract prospect are higher, and (iii) volition and (iv) careerism are lower.*

To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, two linear regression analyses were conducted to investigate the relationships between tenure, contract prospect, volition and careerism on the one hand, and psychological contract content on the other (appendix 2, table 5). As can be seen in table 5, both the agency- and the client model do not have a significant *F*, indicating that the models as a whole do not make sense. These findings are further supported when looking to the individual coefficients of the two models. For the agency side of the model, all four predictors of psychological contract content are not found to be significant. These results do not support all relationships depicted in hypothesis of 2a. For the client side of the model, the predictors tenure, volition and renewed contract prospect were also not found to be significant. Careerism is the only factor that is negatively related to psychological contract content. However, the effect of careerism is very small. These results indicate that the higher careerism is, the lower (more transactional) the content of the psychological contract. These results do not support hypotheses 2bi, 2bii and 2biii yet is supportive of hypothesis 2biv.

Hypothesis 3a: *(i) Agency tenure, (ii) volition, (iii) agency contract prospect and (iv) careerism⁻¹ are negatively related to agency psychological contract breach.*

Hypothesis 3b: *(i) Client tenure, (ii) volition, (iii) client contract prospect and (iv) careerism⁻¹ are negatively related to client psychological contract breach.*

To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, linear regression analyses were conducted to investigate the relationships between tenure, volition, contract prospect and careerism on the one hand, and psychological contract breach on the other (appendix 2, table 6). Both the weighted and the global measure of psychological contract breach were used for the agency and the client side of the model which resulted in four regression analyses. As can be seen in table 6, all four models have a significant *F*, indicating that the model as a whole makes sense. However, the *R*² of the four models is rather low. These results indicate that the four predictors of the theoretical model explain only a very

small proportion of the variance in breach. Thus, there must be a lot more factors that influence psychological contract breach.

On the agency side of the model, agency tenure is not significantly related to weighted psychological contract breach yet positively related to global psychological contract breach. Contrary to hypotheses 3ai, this relationship is positive and thus in the opposite direction as expected. These results do not support hypothesis 3ai. Volition was found to be negatively related to weighted psychological contract breach and not related to global psychological contract breach. Based on the weighted measure of breach, hypothesis 3aii was supported. Further, contract prospect was measured twice for the agency, once for the prospect of a renewed contract and once for the prospect of a permanent contract. Results show that renewed contract prospect is not related to weighted psychological contract breach and negatively related to global psychological contract breach. Also, permanent contract prospect was not related to either measure of breach. Based on the global measure of breach and the renewed contract measure, hypothesis 3aiii was supported. Finally, results show that careerism is positively related to weighted psychological contract breach which automatically means that careerism⁻¹ is negatively related to weighted psychological contract breach. Careerism is not related to global psychological contract breach. For the weighted measure of breach, hypothesis 3aiv is supported. In sum, hypothesis 3ai is not supported, hypotheses 3aii and 3aiv are supported for the weighted measure of breach and hypothesis 3aii is supported for the global measure while using the renewed contract prospect measure.

On the client side of the model, client tenure is not related to either measure of psychological contract breach. These results do not support hypothesis 3bi. Results further show that volition is negatively related to weighted psychological contract breach and not related to global psychological contract breach. Based on the weighted measure of psychological contract breach, hypothesis 3bii is supported. Contract prospect was found to be negatively related to both weighted psychological contract breach and global psychological contract breach. These results support hypothesis 3biii. Finally, careerism is positively related to weighted psychological contract breach which means that careerism⁻¹ is negatively related to weighted psychological contract breach. No relationship was found between careerism and global psychological contract breach. For the weighted measure of breach, hypothesis 3biv is supported. In sum, hypotheses 3bi is not supported, hypotheses 3bii and 3biv are supported for the weighted measure of breach and hypothesis 3biii is supported for both measures of breach.

Hypothesis 4a: Agency psychological contract breach is positively related to agency psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as agency psychological contract breach is more transactional.

Hypothesis 4b: Agency psychological contract breach is positively related to agency psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as agency psychological contract breach is more relational.

Hypothesis 5a: Client psychological contract breach is positively related to client psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as client psychological contract breach is more transactional.

Hypothesis 5b: Client psychological contract breach is positively related to client psychological contract violation and this relationship increases in strength as client psychological contract breach is more relational.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 were investigated with model 1 of PROCESS, bootstrapped 1000 times. Pathways were examined using both the weighted measure of psychological contract breach as well as the global measure of psychological contract breach. Correlations already revealed that agency psychological contract breach is moderately to strongly correlated with agency psychological contract violation with a correlation of $r = .41$ ($p < .01$) for the weighted measure of breach and a correlation of $r = .64$ for the global measure of breach (table 3). Moderation analyses examined whether agency psychological contract content moderates these relationships while controlling for age, gender, education, contract hours and total work experience.

In the pathway that examined agency psychological contract content as a moderator of the relationship between weighted agency psychological contract breach and agency psychological contract violation ($F(8,716) = 19.20$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .18$), the main effect for weighted psychological contract breach was significant ($Beta = .45$, $p < .01$). However, the effects for psychological contract content ($Beta = -.12$, $p = .224$) and the interaction term ($Beta = -.08$, $p = .086$) were not significant. An insignificant effect on the interaction variable indicates that the relationship between weighted agency breach and agency violation is not moderated by psychological contract content. In the pathway that examined agency psychological contract content as a moderator between global agency psychological contract breach and agency psychological contract violation ($F(8,716) = 67.17$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .43$), the main effect for global psychological contract breach was significant ($Beta = .56$, $p < .01$), the main effect for psychological contract content was not significant ($Beta = -.08$, $p = .229$) and their interaction was significant ($Beta = .08$, $p < .01$). These results support moderation. The

conditional effect of global psychological contract breach on psychological contract violation at values of psychological contract content were probed with the Johnson-Neyman technique (table 4) (Hayes, 2012a). Results reveal that the region of significance includes all values of the moderator. Table 4 further shows that the effect of breach on violation is greater for higher (more relational) levels of psychological contract content and smaller for lower (more transactional) levels of psychological contract content ($p < .01$). Based on the global measure of breach, these results support hypothesis 4b and do not support hypothesis 4a.

Table 4: Conditional effect of (global) breach on violation at values of pc content

Conditional effect of X on Y at values of the moderator(s)				
Pcbcontent	Effect	se	t	p
-1,2070	,4581	,0367	12,4873	,0000
-,7363	,4960	,0281	17,6242	,0000
-,2564	,5346	,0244	21,9156	,0000
,2234	,5732	,0277	20,6658	,0000
,6978	,6114	,0361	16,9139	,0000

Values for quantitative moderators are 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles

Hypothesis 5, the client side of the model, was also investigated with model 1 of PROCESS. Correlations already revealed that that client psychological contract breach is strongly related to client psychological contract violation with a correlation of $r = .47$ ($p < .01$) for the weighted measure of breach and a correlation of $r = .65$ for the global measure of breach (table 3). Moderation analyses examined whether client psychological contract content moderates these relationships while controlling for age, gender, education, contract hours and total work experience.

In the pathway that examined client psychological contract content as a moderator between weighted client psychological contract breach and client psychological contract violation ($F(8,715) = 27.93$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .24$), the main effect for weighted psychological contract breach was significant (Beta = .56, $p < .01$). However, the main effect of psychological contract content (Beta = .02, $p = .828$) and the interaction (Beta = -.01, $p = .806$) were both not significant, indicating no moderated effect. When we look to the pathway where psychological contract breach is measured using the global measure ($F(8,715) = 67.50$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .43$), the main effect for global psychological contract breach was significant (Beta = .57, $p < .01$). However, also in this pathway the main effects for psychological contract content (Beta = .01, $p = .835$) and the interaction variable (Beta = .03, $p = .271$) are not significant. These results do not support hypotheses 5a and 5b because no effect for moderation was found.

Hypothesis 6a: Agency psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between agency psychological contract breach and (i) agency organizational satisfaction, (ii) agency organizational commitment and (iii) agency intention to stay.

Hypothesis 6b: Client psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between client psychological contract breach and (i) client job satisfaction, (ii) client organizational commitment and (iii) client intention to stay.

Hypothesis 7a: Agency psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between agency psychological contract breach and (i) client job satisfaction, (ii) client organizational commitment and (iii) client intention to stay.

Hypothesis 7b: Agency psychological contract violation mediates the positive relationship between agency psychological contract breach and (i) client job satisfaction, (ii) client organizational commitment and (iii) client intention to stay.

Hypothesis 8a: Client psychological contract violation mediates the negative relationship between client psychological contract breach and (i) agency organizational satisfaction, (ii) agency organizational commitment and (iii) agency intention to stay.

Hypothesis 8b: Client psychological contract violation mediates the positive relationship between client psychological contract breach and (i) agency organizational satisfaction, (ii) agency organizational commitment and (iii) agency intention to stay.

To investigate hypotheses 6, 7 and 8, model 4 of PROCESS was used and bootstrapped 1000 times (Hayes, 2012b). Model 4 can estimate the direct and indirect effect of a simple mediation model. This model probes two regression analyses which together test for mediation. Regression 1 tests whether the independent variable (X) is related to the mediator (M). Regression 2 tests whether M and X are related to the dependent variable (Y). Model 4 also calculates the total, direct and indirect effect of X on Y. A pathway is fully mediated if both the total effect and the indirect effect are significant and the direct effect is not. A pathway is partially mediated when the total, direct and indirect effects are significant. Separate analyses were conducted for the weighted and the global measure of psychological contract breach for X. Psychological contract violation was entered for M and the different agency and client employee outcomes were entered for Y. The variables age, gender, education, contract hours and total work experience were entered as control variables.

Table 7 of appendix 2 shows the results of the tests for mediation for all 24 pathways between psychological contract breach and the various employee outcomes. The first 12 pathways show the results of hypotheses 6a and 6b. As can be seen, all pathways show a negative significant

total and direct effect between agency/client psychological contract breach and agency/client employee outcomes. Also, the analyses revealed that the indirect effects of these pathways through the mediator are significant because the 95% confidence interval excludes zero. These pathways are thus all partially mediated. These results support hypotheses 6a and 6b.

Hypotheses 7 and 8 anticipated a negative and positive spillover effect between agency/client psychological contract breach and client/agency employee outcomes. The last 12 pathways of table 7 show the results of these hypotheses. The results for mediation differ per employee outcome. Firstly, the relationship between agency psychological contract breach and client job satisfaction through agency psychological contract violation, indicates a negative partial mediation when the weighted measure of breach is used. When the global measure of breach is used, the indirect effect is significant and the direct effect is not, indicating a negative full mediation. These results support hypothesis 7ai and do not support hypothesis 7bi. The same results were found for the client side of the model. The relationship between client psychological contract breach and agency organizational satisfaction through client psychological contract violation, is negative and partially mediated for the weighted measure of breach and negative and fully mediated when the global measure of breach is used. These results support hypothesis 8ai and do not support hypothesis 8bi.

Secondly, the relationship between agency psychological contract breach and client organizational commitment through agency psychological contract violation, does not show a significant indirect effect for both the weighted and the global measure of breach. These results do not support hypotheses 7aii and 7bii. The same results were found for the client side of the model. The relationship between client psychological contract breach and agency organizational commitment through client psychological contract violation, does not show a significant indirect effect for both the weighted and the global measure of breach. These results do not support hypotheses 8aii and 8bii.

Thirdly, the relationship between agency psychological contract breach and client intention to stay through agency psychological contract violation, is negative and partially mediated when the weighted measure of breach is used. This relationship is fully mediated when the global measure of breach is used. These results support hypothesis 7aiii and do not support hypothesis 7biii. For the client side of the model it was found that the relationship between client psychological contract breach and agency intention to stay through client psychological contract violation, is partially mediated for both the weighted and the global measure of breach. Both the direct and indirect effects show a negative significant effect. These results support hypothesis 8aiii and do not support hypothesis 8biii.

In sum, all pathways of hypotheses 6a and 6b are supported, indicating that psychological contract breach, through, psychological contract violation, negatively influences employee outcomes in the respective organization. Further, Hypotheses 7ai, 7aiii, 8ai and 8aiii are supported. These results indicate that psychological contract breach in one organization, through psychological contract violation in the same organization, negatively influences organizational/job satisfaction and intention to stay in the other organization. Hypotheses 7aii and 8aii were not supported, indicating that the spillover effect does not apply for organizational commitment. The several hypotheses of 7b and 8b are not supported because all spillover pathways are negative instead of positive.

Hypothesis 9: *The situational variables (i) non-availability of attractive employment, (ii) procedural justice and (iii) justification for violation moderate all hypothesized relationships between psychological contract breach and employee work attitudes in such a way that these relationship will be weaker for employees who score high on these three variables.*

Hypothesis 10: *Conscientiousness moderates all hypothesized relationships between psychological contract breach and employee work attitudes in such a way that these relationships will be weaker for employees who score high on conscientiousness.*

Hypotheses 9 and 10 were investigated with model 15 of PROCESS and bootstrapped 1000 times (Hayes, 2012b). This model probes 2 regression analyses which together test for moderated mediation. Regression 1 tests whether X is related to M. Regression 2 tests whether the M, X and moderator (V) are related to Y. Process also calculates two interaction variables (M*V and X*V) and tests whether these are related to Y. A significant relationship between X and M and a significant relationship between the M*V-variable and Y, together support for a moderated indirect effect between X and Y (Evers, Klusmann, Schwarzer, & Heuser, 2011). A significant relationship between the X*V-variable and Y supports for a moderated direct effect between X and Y. When an indirect or direct effect for the moderator was found, significance tests were conducted on values of the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of the moderator in order to investigate the nature of the conditional direct and the conditional indirect effects (Hayes, 2012a).

Tables 8-I and 8-II of appendix 2 show the results of the tests for moderation for all 48 pathways of the agency side of the theoretical model and tables 8-III and 8-IV of appendix 2 show these results for all 48 pathways of the client side of the model. Only five pathways on the agency side of the model support moderation. Also, there are only 6 pathways on the client side of the model that support for moderation. Of the significant moderated pathways (table 8-I ; 8-IV), only the

first two pathways of the agency side of the model are in the hypothesized direction. The other pathways are all in the opposite direction. Since hypotheses 9 and 10 hypothesized that all pathways between psychological contract breach and employee outcomes are moderated by non-availability of attractive employment, procedural justice, justification for violation and conscientiousness, hypotheses 9 and 10 could not be supported.

Hypothesis 11a: *Agency psychological contract breach measured by a weighted approach has a stronger relationship with (i) agency psychological contract violation, (ii) agency organizational satisfaction, (iii) agency organizational commitment and (iv) agency intention to stay, than breach measured by a global approach.*

Hypothesis 11b: *Client psychological contract breach measured by a weighted approach has a stronger relationship with (i) client psychological contract violation, (ii) client job satisfaction, (iii) client organizational commitment and (iv) client intention to stay, than breach measured by a global approach.*

Hypothesis 11 was tested using the correlation matrix in table 3. Column 16 shows correlations of weighted agency psychological contract breach and column 17 shows correlations of global agency psychological contract breach. As can be seen, the weighted measure of breach shows higher correlations than the global measure of breach for the relationships with agency organizational commitment and agency intention to stay. However, the differences between the weighted and the global measure are small. For the relationships with agency psychological contract violation and agency organizational satisfaction, correlations are higher for the global measure of breach than the weighted measure of breach. These results do not support hypotheses 11ai and 11aii yet marginally support hypotheses 11aiii and 11aiv.

Column 17 and 18 of table 3 show the weighted and global measures of client psychological contract breach. The weighted measure of breach is only more highly correlated than the global measure of breach for the relationship with client intention to stay. However, the difference between the weighted and the global measure is small. For the relationship with client psychological contract violation, correlation is higher for the global measure than the weighted measure of breach. Further, for the relationships with client job satisfaction and client organizational commitment, correlations of the global and weighted measure are quit alike. These results do not support hypotheses 11bi, 11bii and 11biii yet marginally support hypothesis 11biv.

6. Conclusion and discussion

This study had four purposes: first, the content of the psychological contract of temporary employees was investigated. Second, this paper tested whether the hypothesized relationships of the model of Zhao et al. (2007) also apply for the psychological contracts of temporaries. Third, this paper investigated whether there is a spillover effect between psychological contract breach in one organization and employee outcomes in the other organization and examined whether this effect is positive or negative. And last, the new weighted measurement scale of psychological contract breach of Revell (2012) was tested on its validity. The first three paragraphs of this chapter give an answer to the first three research questions. The fourth paragraph gives practical advice to agency- and client organizations. Next, the research limitations of the present study and directions for future research are reviewed in paragraph 6.5. In this section, the fourth research question is also answered. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.

6.1 The psychological contract content

It was hypothesized that the psychological contract can be measured on a continuum ranging from transactional to relational. Results indicate that this hypothesis is not supported by the data. Transactional and relational psychological contract content are positively correlated, indicating that a high score on transactional psychological contract content relates to a high score on relational psychological contract content, and vice versa. These results can indicate two things: (1) Revell's scale is not an appropriate scale to measure transactional and relational psychological contract or (2) the psychological contract is not unidimensional. Based on the results of this study, it is likely that the psychological contract exists out of several dimensions on which the psychological contract can be breached and that the amount of breach on each dimension depends per employee and per organization. In this case, each dimension can be archived to be transactional or relational.

This study found that the psychological contracts of temporary employees are relatively more transactional than relational. However, out of the possible range of psychological contract content scores (-2; 2), the mean of agency psychological contract content is -.22 and the mean of client psychological contract content is -.24. These results indicate that both psychological contracts are only slightly more transactional than relational and thus contain many relational elements as well. Also, both means of psychological contract content are close together, indicating that the content of the psychological contracts of the agency-organization and the client-organization are quit alike. These findings suggest that, contrary to expectations, temporaries do not have more relational expectations of the client-organization than they have of the agency-organization. An additional and

narrow investigation of the psychological contract dimensions was done in order of the agency-organization². In this investigation, the obligations that comprised the psychological contract of the agency-organization and the client-organization were compared. Based on this comparison, it seems likely that temporaries have the same kind of expectations of the agency-organization as they have of the client-organization.

Further results found that of the four possible predictors of psychological contract content (tenure, contract prospect, volition, careerism), only careerism marginally influences the amount of transactional/relational expectations in the psychological contract of the client-organization. As expected, the higher careerism is, the more transactional the client psychological contract becomes. That the other three predictors do not influence the content of both psychological contracts of temporaries suggest that temporary employees are not influenced by these external factors when they determine on which components the agency-organization and client-organization are obligated.

6.2 Antecedents and consequences of psychological contract breach

It was hypothesized that tenure, volition, contract prospect and careerism influence the psychological contracts of temporary employees. Results indicate that agency/client tenure is not a predictor of agency/client psychological contract breach. These results conflict with findings of Bal et al. (2012) who found that tenure does influence the psychological contract of employees. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that the average tenure of temporaries with the agency-organization is 1.81 years and the average tenure of temporaries with the client organization is 1.45 years. Temporaries of the present sample thus do not have a long work history with both organizations, which might be an indicator of range restriction. Therefore, temporaries may not have had time to adjust their expectations to reality which could have reduced the chance of breach of their psychological contracts. It is likely that temporary employees see a lot of different agency- and client-organization over the years. Therefore, tenure is not a predictor of breach of temporaries' psychological contracts.

Further results indicate that only the measure of agency renewed contract prospect is negatively related to agency breach. The measure of permanent agency contract prospect was not found to be related to agency psychological contract breach. These results can be explained by the finding that only 4.2% of respondents answered that they have the prospect on a permanent contract with the agency while 28.2% indicated that they had the prospect on a renewed contract with the agency. Apparently, it is not common for the agency-organization to give their employees

² Results can be inquired on request at the author.

(the prospect of) a permanent contract³. Further, client renewed contract prospect was also found to be negatively related to client psychological contract breach. Volition and careerism⁻¹ were found to be negatively related to both agency and client breach. Thus careerism is positively related to psychological contract breach. These results indicate that prospect on a renewed contract and the choice to work on a temporary basis (volition), decrease the chance that the psychological contracts of temporaries will be breached. Careerism on the other hand, increases the chance that the psychological contracts of temporaries will be breached.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 proposed that psychological contract content influences the strength of the relationship between psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation. Results indicate that this proposition is significant for the agency side of the theoretical model, while using the global measure of psychological contract breach. This proposition is not significant when using the weighted measure of breach and is also not significant for both measures of breach on the client side of the model. These findings support the earlier results that the content of the psychological contract seems to exist out of both transactional and relational parts and that the content of the contract does not differ meaningfully between the agency-organization and the client-organization.

Results also revealed that agency psychological contract breach, through agency psychological contract violation, is related to agency job satisfaction, agency organizational commitment and agency intention to leave. The same results were found for the client side of the theoretical model. These findings support the proposition that the theoretical model of Zhao et al. (2007) also applies to temporary employees. It is striking that as well the direct effects as the total effects between breach and employee outcomes are all higher for the weighted measure of breach than for the global measure of breach (table 7, appendix 2). The indirect effect however seems more alike for the weighted and global measure. These findings indicate that when the weighted measure of breach is used for X, more variance in Y is explained than when the global measure of breach is used. The weighted measure of breach is thus a better predictor of employee outcomes than the global measure of breach. Also, these findings seem to indicate that the weighted measure of breach makes a better distinction between psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation.

6.3 The spillover effect of psychological contract breach

This paper proposed that psychological contract breach in the agency-organization does not only influence employee outcomes in the agency-organization, but also spills over and influences

³ By Dutch law, employers can only give three temporary contracts to employees and this period cannot exceed 36 months. After that, an employer is obligated to offer a permanent contract (Werk, 2012).

employee outcomes in the client-organization. The same proposition was set for the effect of psychological contract breach in the client-organization on employee outcomes in the agency-organization. Results show that agency psychological contract breach, through agency psychological contract violation, negatively influences the job satisfaction and intention to stay at the client organization for both measures of breach. Also, client psychological contract breach, through client psychological contract violation, negatively influences the organizational satisfaction and intention to stay at the agency organization for both measures of breach.

Interestingly, there were differences between the global and weighted measure of breach and the degree of mediation. The global measure of psychological contract breach fully mediated three of the four above pathways while the weighted measure of psychological contract breach partially mediated all of the above four pathways. These findings again seem to indicate that global psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation are more closely aligned than weighted psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation. When psychological contract violation is introduced in the relationship between global breach and the other organizations' employee outcomes, the direct pathway disappears. These findings are supported by the correlationmatrix (table 3), which shows that the correlation between global breach and violation is higher than the relationship between weighted breach and violation. These findings inform the discussion in the literature (Cassar & Briner, 2011; Zhao, et al., 2007) about whether or not psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation are distinct constructs. Since most articles measure psychological contract breach with a global measure and then, psychological contract breach and psychological contract violation are highly correlated (Raja, et al., 2004; Robinson & Morrison, 2000; Zhao, et al., 2007). It is therefore argued that breach measured with a weighted measure is doing more justice to the theoretical concept of the psychological contract than breach measured with a global measure.

Further results found that both agency and client psychological contract breach, through psychological contract violation, do not influence organizational commitment in the respective other organization. This finding is as expected when looking to the correlationmatrix in table 3, where it can be seen that, out of the three employee outcome variables, organizational commitment has the lowest correlation with both measures of psychological contract breach and with psychological contract violation. Table 3 also shows that agency- and client organizational commitment have lower means and standard deviations than the respective other two employee outcomes organizational/job satisfaction and intention to stay. These results might indicate that temporary employees by and large have low organizational commitment. Because temporaries stay for short periods of time within one organization, it is likely that they will not commit themselves to these organizations. They see themselves as just temporary employees. Organizational commitment is

therefore a very different outcome variable than job/organizational satisfaction and intention to stay because the latter can more easily occur in every employment setting.

The above findings might also indicate that tenure moderates the relationship between psychological contract breach and organizational commitment. Therefore, an additional test for moderated mediation was performed using model 15 of PROCESS (Hayes, 2012b). Table 9 of appendix 2 shows the results of this test. As can be seen, only one path supported moderated mediation. Both the direct and the indirect effect of the relationship between weighted client psychological contract breach and agency organizational commitment, through client psychological contract violation, was moderated by client tenure. Significance tests revealed that the direct effect became less strong when tenure increased. Significance tests also revealed that the indirect effect is only significant for those respondents who score very high on client tenure because the conditional effect is only significant at the 90th percentiles. Overall, these results indicate that tenure is not a moderator of the relationship between psychological contract breach and organizational commitment. However, it must be noted that it might also be the case that the used dataset is subject to restriction of range for tenure, as indicated by the low means and standard deviations for tenure in the correlation matrix (table 3). It is possible that only temporaries with a short tenure have filled in the questionnaire which resulted in non-significant results for all hypotheses with tenure.

Hypotheses 9 and 10 proposed that four variables moderate mediation pathways between psychological contract breach and employee outcomes. Only eleven out of the 96 pathways supported moderated mediation. There seems to be no pattern about when paths for moderated mediation are significant and when they are not: moderation occurred in all three employee outcomes, for all four moderators and with as well the weighted as the global measure of breach. Further, it is striking to see that only two pathways were in the hypothesized direction. Apparently, contextual factors can also influence mediation paths in a negative way. It is also noteworthy that there seems to be no moderation of all spillover pathways between client breach and agency outcomes. Overall, of the pathways that did show an effect of moderated mediation, the conditional effects did not increase or decrease with more than .30. Based on these results, it is very likely that the analyses for moderated mediation were subject to statistical errors of chance. The more analyses are conducted, the higher the chance becomes that some analyses are significant. It is therefore likely that situational variables and conscientiousness do not influence the relationship between psychological contract breach and employee outcomes of temporary employees.

6.4 Managerial implications

This study has practical consequences for organizations who work with temporary employees. First, results show that breach of the psychological contracts of temporary employees influences the organizational/job satisfaction, organizational commitment and intention to stay in the respective organization. Also, breach in one organization influences the organizational/job satisfaction and intention to stay in the respective other organization. It is thus up to both organizations to make sure to properly manage the psychological contracts of their temporary employees since breach affects employee outcomes in both organizations. Results of present study show that the psychological contracts of temporary employees exist out as well transactional as relational elements for both the agency- and client-organization. Therefore, both organizations should manage temporary employees not only on transactional elements but also on relational elements. It is advised to agency-organizations to investigate on which transactional and relational obligations their employees hold the agency-organization responsible and on which obligations employees hold their client-organization responsible. Agency-organizations can then advise their clients about how to manage the psychological contracts of temporary employees. It is also advised to client-organizations to treat temporary employees the same in personnel procedures as their regular employees.

Second, results of current investigation show that the chance on psychological contract breach beforehand decreases when temporary employees have the prospect on a renewed contract, score high on volition and score low on careerism. It is therefore advised to the agency-organization to reconsider their personnel selection criteria. If agency-organizations want to manage the psychological contracts of their employees, this is more easy when their employees want to work as temporary employee (high on volition) and are not planning to leave the organization soon (low on careerism). Also, agency-organizations should keep in touch with their employees and ask them to their future career plans. If possible and desirable, it is good to give temporary employees the prospect on a renewed contract with the agency-organization. It is also good for client-organizations to give their temporary employees the prospect on a renewed contract. Temporary employees are pleased to hear that their client-organization is happy with them and would like them to stay for another period of time. The chance on psychological contract breach will then decrease.

6.5 Research strengths, limitations and directions for future research

This study has strengths but also limitations. In order to increase the strength of this study, some issues were taken into account that prevent for threats to reliability. Participant error occurs when a respondent's mood influences his or her responses on the questionnaire. Questionnaires sent out on

different times during the week may generate different results. Participant error can also occur if responses are biased because the behavior of respondents varies. For example, an individual can misread a question or lose his or her concentration when filling in a questionnaire (Mitchell & Jolley, 2010). In order to prevent participant error, the questionnaire was sent out in the middle of the week, on Wednesday. By doing this, the chance also increased that respondents actually filled in the questionnaire. Further, items in the questionnaire were worded in such a way that it was clear for the respondent to which organization was referred to. In this way, the chance increased that the respondent had the right organization in mind when answering questions (the agency or client-organization). Last, most constructs used in this survey were measured with a scale consisting out of multiple items. When using a measurement scale, participant error will be balanced out (Mitchell & Jolley, 2010).

Participant bias can occur when respondents answer what they think their boss wants them to answer. In order to reduce this threat, questionnaires were handled confidentially. Only one member of the research group had access to the raw database. Also, the agency-organization was not given access to this database. In addition, the agency-organization explicitly named in the questionnaire-invitation that the questionnaires will be used in a positive way: to improve the employee services of the organization. Further, observer error occurs when the methods of retrieving data from respondents differs among observers. According to Mitchell (2010), one way to reduce observer error is to replace human observers with machines so all answers of respondents will be gathered in the exact same way. The present study used a self-administered mail questionnaire. In this way, there can be no observer-error or observer bias.

There were also some issues taken into account in order to prevent for threats to validity. Content- and construct-validity were increased by using measurement scales that were already developed, tested and used in previous studies. Also, translation of items into Dutch followed translation procedures of Brislin (1970). A last strength of this study is that the total number of respondents is quite high.

There are also some limitations of this study that influence interpretations of the results. A first limitation is that the use of cross-sectional data prevents for making inferences about causal relationships. Based on the results of this study, no conclusions can be drawn about, for example, whether psychological contract breach leads to decreased employee outcomes or whether low employee outcomes lead to more psychological contract breach. It would have been better if data were gathered longitudinally. However, it must be stated that a longitudinal design is very hard to conduct with temporary employees because they change jobs often, as indicated by the short tenure of respondents (table 3).

A second limitation concerns the reliability of the results of present study. This study included a lot of different variables and analyses which increases the probability that results were due to statistical errors and chance. The more statistical analyses are done, the higher the chance that some of these analyses are significant, while in fact these relationships are not significant. It is very likely that the significant pathways of the analyses for moderated mediation (hypotheses 9 and 10) were subject to this statistical error because there was no pattern to discover about why some pathways were significant and others were not. Another concern is that the spillover analyses were not controlled by the respective employee outcome of the other organizations. It is therefore possible that spillover results were due to one general factor of job satisfaction or intention to stay.

A third limitation concerns the generalizability of the present findings. The response rate of this study was rather low. It is thus likely that the sample of present study does not represent the target group. Further, all respondents are employed by one and the same agency-organization. The chance on threats for history is therefore present. It would have been better if respondents of multiple agency-organizations were included in order to increase external validity. The generalizability of the client side of the model is therefore better, because respondents worked in many different client-organizations. Next to this, the findings from the current sample cannot be generalized to all temporary employees. Due to the selection of respondents for the questionnaire invitation, only a selected group employees of the agency-organization was approached. The approached employees were indicated as having completed higher vocational education or higher. Therefore, this study is generalizable to higher educated temporaries of the client side of the theoretical model and quite generalizable for higher educated employees of the agency-side of the theoretical model. This study is not generalizable to lower educated temporary employees. Further research should therefore extend the target-group with lower educated employees and respondents of several agency-organizations in order to interpret the findings of present study and to make generalizations to the whole temporary workforce.

Results further showed that respondents had a relatively short tenure with both the agency-organization and the client-organization. It might be possible that the dataset is subject to restriction of range for tenure. Maybe, only temporary employees who have a short tenure with the agency- and client-organization filled in the questionnaire. However, it can also be the case that higher educated temporaries do all change jobs often and that tenure is related to the educational degree of temporary employees. It might be interesting to further investigate the effect of tenure on temporary employees.

The weighted measurement scale of psychological contract breach of Revell (2012) also has its own strengths as limitations. The scale is very extensive and gives the opportunity to measure in detail the

employer obligations that comprise the psychological contract. This is in contrast with the global scale, which only measures the fulfillment of employer obligations in general. The data that can be gathered with the weighted measurement scale is a rich source of information for managers. For example, the data can be used to cluster employees in profiles and give a different set of employer obligations per profile. Also, data can be used to distinguish a different set of employer obligations to the agency- and client-organization of temporary employees. Results showed that weighted psychological contract breach correlated lower with psychological contract violation than global psychological contract breach. Global breach and violation are thus measuring for a great part the same construct. Further, the correlations between breach and employee outcomes were quit alike for the weighted and global measure. It is therefore argued that the weighted measure is doing more justice to the theoretical concept of the psychological contract than breach measured with a global measure.

However, there are also some limitations to the measurement scale of Revell. Narrow investigation of the employer obligations⁴ that formed the psychological contracts of the agency- and the client-organization, revealed that the content of the psychological contracts of temporaries, did not differ very much between the agency-organization and the client-organization. It is therefore suspected that the weighted measure of breach is not yet reliable enough to measure psychological contract breach. Because the measurement scale consists out of 55 items which had to be filled in two times, it is likely that respondents were prone to give uniform answers to items and did not make clear distinctions between expectations they had of the agency- and of the client-organization. This prospect is confirmed by feedback of several respondents about the measurement scale. They thought that several items of the scale looked alike and that the total number of items was too much.

It is advised to use a weighted measure of breach in future psychological contract breach studies. However, in order to properly use the measurement scale of Revell (2012), the scale has to be investigated more. It is advised to shorten the measurement scale by compressing it with the help of factor analyses and taking together items that are similar. It is suspected that answers of respondents will become more reliable when the list of items is much shorter. It is also suspected that this will result in a clearer distinction between the content of the psychological contracts of the agency-organization and the client-organization. It would further be interesting to explore the data of weighted psychological contract breach more by making profiles of temporary employees and investigate the content of each profile's psychological contract. For example, on what employer

⁴ Narrow investigation was done in order of the agency-organization. Results can be inquired on request at the author.

obligations do highly educated temporary employees in the age 20-30 who work full time, hold their agency- and client organization accountable for. By doing this for different profiles, managers get very rich information about how to manage the psychological contracts of different types of employees.

Future research should also include more respondents of different agency-organizations in the target group in order to enlarge the generalizability. Also, it would be interesting to include lower educated temporary employees in the target group as to investigate whether the same results apply for them. Future research should further consider investigating the effect of tenure on the effect of psychological contract breach of temporary employees.

6.6 Concluding remarks

Despite the limitations of present research, this study contributes to the academic literature in five ways. First, this study breaks with existing theory that the psychological contract can be measured on a continuum (Lee & Faller, 2005; Millward & Hopkins, 1998; Rousseau, 1989). This study shows that the transactional and relational elements of the psychological contract are not negatively correlated. Second, this study shows that the degree of transactional and relational items of the psychological contracts of temporary employees is not very different for the agency- and client-organization. Temporary employees do both have transactional and relational expectations of both organizations. Third, this study shows that psychological contract breach of temporary employees is negatively influenced by the prospect of a renewed contract and the preference for temporary work of temporary employees. Careerism on the other hand is positively related to the psychological contract breach of temporary employees. The fourth, and most important, contribution is that this study supports the model of Zhao et al. (2007) for temporary employees. This study even extends this model by showing that the effect of breach at times also spills over to the other organization. Both organizational/job satisfaction and intention to stay are related to psychological contract breach of the respective other organization. This relationship was not found for organizational commitment. This study therefore proposes that temporary employees show low organizational commitment in general. Last, this study promotes the use of a weighted measure of psychological contract breach in future research.

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Appendix 1: Weighted psychological contract measure

1. Provides the opportunity to follow training and/or courses	29. Provides realistic targets
2. Provides training that broadens my knowledge	30. Evaluates rules consistently
3. Provides payment for training and/or courses that I follow	31. Pays a fair amount of salary in exchange for my expertise
4. Provides training that stimulates my personal development	32. Pays my salary on time
5. Provides feedback on a continuous basis	33. Ensures I am happy with the salary I receive
6. Provides high quality coaching	34. Provides job security
7. Provides frequent communication opportunities	35. Ensures I can continue to work here in the future
8. Provides help in case I need it	36. Offers alternative employment in case I am let go
9. Provides freedom in how I perform my work	37. Provides opportunities to develop my career
10. Provides freedom to be creative	38. Provides fitting career development opportunities
11. Provides high quality supervision	39. Provides space to develop my career
12. Provides autonomy in the way I perform my work	40. Supports me in my career development
13. Provides feedback so that I can correct my errors	41. Provides flexibility in working hours
14. Provides a caring environment	42. Provides flexible working conditions
15. Has an interest in my personal life	43. Has a flexible attitude
16. Has respect for me as an employee	44. Provides challenging work assignments
17. Provides support	45. Motivates me to achieve targets
18. Takes my opinion into account	46. Provides interesting work
19. Shows appreciation for the work I have done	47. Provides a realistic workload
20. Recognizes good work	48. Provides a work-life balance
21. Provides rewards for good work	49. Provides a workload that is workable
22. Provides facilities to do my job	50. Provides a stress-free work environment
23. Provides a pleasant atmosphere	51. Provides role clarity
24. Provides an informal atmosphere	52. Provides a clear job description
25. Provides a safe atmosphere	53. Provides clarity on my growth opportunities
26. Provides a stable atmosphere	54. Is trustworthy
27. Follows up on agreements that have been made	55. Is honest with respect to job related aspects
28. Pursues the norms and values that represent the culture of the organization	

Transactional items	Relational items
3. Provides payment for training and/or courses that I follow	1. Provides the opportunity to follow training and/or courses
13. Provides feedback so that I can correct my errors	2. Provides training that broadens my knowledge
21. Provides rewards for good work	4. Provides training that stimulates my personal development
22. Provides facilities to do my job	5. Provides feedback on a continuous basis
27. Follows up on agreements that have been made	6. Provides high quality coaching
29. Provides realistic targets	7. Provides frequent communication opportunities
31. Pays a fair amount of salary in exchange for my expertise	8. Provides help in case I need it
32. Pays my salary on time	9. Provides freedom in how I perform my work
33. Ensures I am happy with the salary I receive	10. Provides freedom to be creative
45. Motivates me to achieve targets	11. Provides high quality supervision
47. Provides a realistic workload	12. Provides autonomy in the way I perform my work
49. Provides a workload that is workable	14. Provides a caring environment
52. Provides a clear job description	15. Has an interest in my personal life
	16. Has respect for me as an employee
	17. Provides support
	18. Takes my opinion into account
	19. Shows appreciation for the work I have done
	20. Recognizes good work
	23. Provides a pleasant atmosphere
	24. Provides an informal atmosphere
	25. Provides a safe atmosphere
	26. Provides a stable atmosphere
	28. Pursues the norms and values that represent the culture of the organization
	30. Evaluates rules consistently
	34. Provides job security
	35. Ensures I can continue to work here in the future
	36. Offers alternative employment in case I am let go
	37. Provides opportunities to develop my career
	38. Provides fitting career development opportunities
	39. Provides space to develop my career
	40. Supports me in my career development
	41. Provides flexibility in working hours
	42. Provides flexible working conditions
	43. Has a flexible attitude
	44. Provides challenging work assignments
	46. Provides interesting work
	48. Provides a work-life balance
	50. Provides a stress-free work environment
	51. Provides role clarity
	53. Provides clarity on my growth opportunities
	54. Is trustworthy
	55. Is honest with respect to job related aspects

Appendix 2: Results of hierarchical regression analyses

Table 5: Linear regression model

Agency psychological contract content			Client psychological contract content		
Model Summary	R square	.00	Model Summary	R square	.01
	Adjusted R square	.00		Adjusted R square	.00
Anova	<i>F</i>	0.68	Anova	<i>F</i>	1.90
	sig	.64		sig	.11
Agency tenure	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.00	Client tenure	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.00
	<i>t</i>	-0.16		<i>t</i>	-0.07
	sig	.87		sig	.94
Volition	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.00	Volition	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.00
	<i>t</i>	-0.17		<i>t</i>	-0.59
	sig	.86		sig	.56
Agency renewed contract prospect	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.01	Client renewed contract prospect	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.01
	<i>t</i>	1.05		<i>t</i>	0.70
	sig	.29		sig	.49
Agency permanent contract prospect	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.00			
	<i>t</i>	0.37			
	sig	.71			
Careerism	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.00	Careerism	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	-0.03
	<i>t</i>	-0.24		<i>t</i>	-2.40
	sig	.81		sig	.02

Table 6: Linear regression model

		Weighted agency psychological contract breach	Global agency psychological contract breach			Weighted client psychological contract breach	Global client psychological contract breach
Model Summary	R square	.05	.02	Model Summary	R square	.06	.04
	Adjusted R square	.04	.01		Adjusted R square	.06	.03
Anova	<i>F</i>	7.97	3.26	Anova	<i>F</i>	13.05	7.45
	sig	.00	.01		sig	.00	.00
Agency tenure	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.02	0.04	Client tenure	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.01	0.01
	<i>t</i>	1.93	3.11		<i>t</i>	0.75	0.53
	sig	.054	.00		sig	.45	.59
Volition	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	-0.10	-0.02	Volition	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	-0.11	0.02
	<i>t</i>	-4.56	-0.69		<i>t</i>	-4.97	0.56
	sig	.00	.49		sig	.00	.57
Agency renewed contract prospect	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	-0.03	-0.12	Client renewed contract prospect	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	-0.11	-0.22
	<i>t</i>	-0.78	-2.50		<i>t</i>	-3.74	-5.14
	sig	.43	.01		sig	.00	.00
Agency permanent contract prospect	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	-0.05	0.00				
	<i>t</i>	-1.42	0.02				
	sig	.16	.99				
Careerism	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.13	0.02	Careerism	Unstandardized coefficient <i>B</i>	0.16	0.06
	<i>t</i>	3.85	0.38		<i>t</i>	4.78	1.25
	sig	.00	.70		sig	.00	.21

Table 7: Tests for mediation

Y	X	M	Regression 1						Regression 2						Total Effect X-Y		Direct effect X-Y		Indirect effect X-Y				
			Model summary				X-M		Model summary				M-Y		X-Y		effect	p	effect	p	effect	lower CI	Upper CI
			df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	t	p							
A sat.	A pcb (weight)	A pcv	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	7,717	120,34	0,000	0,54	-22,40	0,000	-6,72	0,000	-0,60	0,000	-0,26	0,000	-0,34	-0,43	-0,26
A sat.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	7,717	118,55	0,000	0,54	-17,01	0,000	-6,25	0,000	-0,57	0,000	-0,21	0,000	-0,36	-0,43	-0,29
A comm.	A pcb (weight)	A pcv	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	7,717	22,02	0,000	0,18	-4,02	0,000	-5,61	0,000	-0,34	0,000	-0,27	0,000	-0,07	-0,11	-0,04
A comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	7,717	19,11	0,000	0,16	-2,79	0,005	-3,74	0,000	-0,23	0,000	-0,16	0,000	-0,07	-0,12	-0,02
A int. stay	A pcb (weight)	A pcv	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	7,717	41,81	0,000	0,29	-9,05	0,000	-5,61	0,000	-0,52	0,000	-0,32	0,000	-0,20	-0,27	-0,15
A int. stay	A pcb (global)	A pcv	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	7,717	36,52	0,000	0,26	-8,01	0,000	-2,01	0,045	-0,35	0,000	-0,10	0,045	-0,25	-0,31	-0,19
C sat.	C pcb (weight)	C pcv	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	7,716	53,91	0,000	0,35	-12,23	0,000	-6,17	0,000	-0,54	0,000	-0,28	0,000	-0,26	-0,32	-0,20
C sat.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	7,717	48,64	0,000	0,32	-10,60	0,000	-3,57	0,000	-0,40	0,000	-0,14	0,000	-0,26	-0,32	-0,20
C comm.	C pcb (weight)	C pcv	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	7,716	18,43	0,000	0,15	-4,84	0,000	-5,79	0,000	-0,40	0,000	-0,29	0,000	-0,11	-0,16	-0,07
C comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	7,717	16,44	0,000	0,14	-3,53	0,000	-4,60	0,000	-0,29	0,000	-0,19	0,000	-0,09	-0,14	-0,04
C int. stay	C pcb (weight)	C pcv	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	7,716	39,39	0,000	0,28	-7,58	0,000	-6,53	0,000	-0,63	0,000	-0,41	0,000	-0,22	-0,29	-0,16
C int. stay	C pcb (global)	C pcv	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	7,717	33,98	0,000	0,25	-6,64	0,000	-3,73	0,000	-0,42	0,000	-0,20	0,000	-0,22	-0,29	-0,17
C sat.	A pcb (weight)	A pcv	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	7,717	16,56	0,000	0,139	-5,68	0,000	-3,82	0,000	-0,33	0,000	-0,21	0,000	-0,12	-0,18	-0,07
C sat.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	7,717	14,40	0,000	0,12	-5,25	0,000	-1,14	0,253	-0,21	0,000	-0,05	0,253	-0,16	-0,23	-0,09
C comm.	A pcb (weight)	A pcv	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	7,717	5,36	0,000	0,05	-0,78	0,435	-3,22	0,001	-0,19	0,000	-0,18	0,001	-0,02	-0,06	0,03
C comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	7,717	3,88	0,000	0,04	-1,30	0,196	-0,63	0,526	-0,07	0,062	-0,03	0,526	-0,04	-0,10	0,03
C int. stay	A pcb (weight)	A pcv	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	7,717	19,54	0,000	0,16	-3,21	0,001	-5,07	0,000	-0,45	0,000	-0,36	0,000	-0,09	-0,15	-0,04
C int. stay	A pcb (global)	A pcv	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	7,717	15,33	0,000	0,13	-4,13	0,000	-0,25	0,806	-0,18	0,000	-0,02	0,806	-0,16	-0,24	-0,10
A sat.	C pcb (weight)	C pcv	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	7,716	19,77	0,000	0,16	-7,10	0,000	-3,31	0,001	-0,33	0,000	-0,17	0,001	-0,16	-0,22	-0,10
A sat.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	7,717	18,58	0,000	0,15	0,15	0,000	-1,88	0,061	-0,25	0,000	-0,08	0,061	-0,17	-0,23	-0,11
A comm.	C pcb (weight)	C pcv	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	7,716	12,14	0,000	0,11	-0,24	0,814	-3,20	0,001	-0,16	0,000	-0,15	0,001	-0,01	-0,04	0,03
A comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	7,717	11,10	0,000	0,10	-0,23	0,817	-1,88	0,060	-0,08	0,009	-0,08	0,060	-0,01	-0,05	0,04
A int. stay	C pcb (weight)	C pcv	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	7,716	27,30	0,000	0,21	-5,46	0,000	-4,40	0,000	-0,39	0,000	-0,25	0,000	-0,14	-0,20	-0,09
A int. stay	C pcb (global)	C pcv	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	7,717	25,57	0,000	0,20	-4,47	0,000	-3,11	0,002	-0,28	0,000	-0,15	0,002	-0,14	-0,19	-0,08

Table 8-II: Tests for moderated mediation

Y	X	M	V	Regression 1						Regression 2										Conditional direct effect* at percentiles:					Conditional indirect effect** at percentiles:								
				Model summary				X-M		Model summary				M-Y		X-Y		V-Y		(M*V) - DV		(X*V) - Y		10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th
				df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	t	p	t	p	t	p	t	p										
C sat.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod i	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	12,72	0,000	0,15	-0,50	0,621	-1,33	0,186	1,63	0,103	-1,26	0,207	0,31	0,755										
C sat.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod ii	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	12,25	0,000	0,15	-0,89	0,374	-0,46	0,643	1,46	0,144	-1,53	0,127	-0,89	0,373										
C sat.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod iii	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	12,02	0,000	0,14	-1,15	0,252	-0,49	0,626	1,57	0,116	-0,48	0,631	-0,44	0,657										
C sat.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	Consc.	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	18,32	0,000	0,20	0,18	0,854	-0,30	0,766	3,62	0,000	-0,86	0,390	-0,21	0,833										
C sat.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod i	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	11,38	0,000	0,14	-1,19	0,234	0,35	0,724	2,58	0,010	-0,40	0,690	-0,66	0,512										
C sat.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod ii	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	10,86	0,000	0,13	-1,59	0,112	1,10	0,271	2,06	0,039	-0,51	0,609	-1,62	0,105										
C sat.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod iii	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	10,83	0,000	0,13	-0,41	0,686	-0,92	0,360	1,35	0,177	-1,08	0,282	0,80	0,426										
C sat.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	Consc.	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	16,32	0,000	0,19	-0,01	0,995	0,34	0,731	4,33	0,000	-0,73	0,466	-0,39	0,699										
C comm.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod i	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	6,40	0,000	0,08	1,42	0,157	-0,91	0,361	2,81	0,005	-1,73	0,085	0,10	0,920										
C comm.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod ii	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	4,10	0,000	0,05	-0,58	0,565	0,64	0,523	1,65	0,099	0,21	0,831	-1,78	0,076										
C comm.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod iii	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	3,94	0,000	0,05	-0,40	0,689	-0,01	0,990	1,14	0,255	0,19	0,851	-0,81	0,417										
C comm.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	Consc.	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	7,68	0,000	0,10	1,15	0,250	1,00	0,317	4,29	0,000	-1,13	0,257	-1,42	0,155										
C comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod i	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	5,61	0,000	0,07	0,33	0,742	0,72	0,474	3,93	0,000	-0,75	0,452	-0,84	0,402										
C comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod ii	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	2,93	0,001	0,04	-0,84	0,403	0,93	0,354	1,31	0,190	0,34	0,736	-1,17	0,243										
C comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod iii	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	3,00	0,001	0,04	-0,13	0,896	-0,17	0,865	0,91	0,364	-0,22	0,828	0,11	0,913										
C comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	Consc.	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	6,30	0,000	0,08	1,29	0,197	0,27	0,788	4,07	0,000	-1,47	0,143	-0,26	0,796										
C int. stay	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod i	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	15,27	0,000	0,18	0,22	0,823	-1,63	0,104	1,88	0,061	-1,24	0,216	0,27	0,787										
C int. stay	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod ii	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	14,20	0,000	0,17	-1,64	0,101	-0,27	0,790	0,73	0,465	0,30	0,767	-1,57	0,117										
C int. stay	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A mod iii	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	14,09	0,000	0,16	-2,17	0,030	-0,37	0,712	-0,41	0,681	1,21	0,228	-1,12	0,265										
C int. stay	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	Consc.	6,718	24,77	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,714	17,15	0,000	0,19	0,92	0,357	-0,42	0,672	3,04	0,003	-1,28	0,201	-0,22	0,824										
C int. stay	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod i	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	12,59	0,000	0,15	-0,43	0,665	-0,07	0,944	2,53	0,012	-0,85	0,396	0,09	0,930										
C int. stay	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod ii	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	10,92	0,000	0,13	-2,04	0,042	1,02	0,306	0,61	0,545	0,49	0,627	-1,22	0,222										
C int. stay	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A mod iii	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	10,80	0,000	0,13	-2,01	0,045	0,33	0,741	-0,61	0,543	0,90	0,371	-0,44	0,659										
C int. stay	A pcb (global)	A pcv	Consc.	6,718	84,31	0,000	0,41	21,80	0,000	10,714	14,05	0,000	0,16	0,32	0,751	0,82	0,412	3,97	0,000	-0,92	0,355	-0,77	0,439										

* Effects are only given for significant effects: where p < .05

** Effects are only given for significant effects: where the confidence interval excludes 0

Mod i = non-availability of attractive employment alternatives

mod ii = procedural justice

mod iii = justification for violation

Table 8-IV: Tests for moderated mediation

Y	X	M	V	Regression 1						Regression 2										Conditional direct effect* at percentiles:					Conditional indirect effect** at percentiles:							
				Model summary				X-M		Model summary				M-Y		X-Y		V-Y												(M*V) - DV		(X*V) - Y
				df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	t	p	t	p	t	p	t	p	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	10th	25th	50th	75th
A sat.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod i	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	14,05	0,000	0,16	-0,91	0,364	-2,28	0,023	-0,19	0,849	-1,24	0,215	1,30	0,193									
A sat.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod ii	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	14,72	0,000	0,17	-0,37	0,715	-3,07	0,002	-0,10	0,921	-2,65	0,008	1,95	0,052									
A sat.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod iii	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	14,27	0,000	0,17	-1,74	0,082	-2,82	0,005	-0,74	0,460	-0,99	0,321	1,83	0,067									
A sat.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	Consc.	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	15,91	0,000	0,18	-2,82	0,005	1,42	0,155	1,83	0,068	1,92	0,055	-1,89	0,059									
A sat.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod i	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	13,03	0,000	0,15	-1,50	0,135	-0,51	0,611	0,73	0,466	-0,46	0,649	-0,07	0,945									
A sat.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod ii	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	13,38	0,000	0,16	-0,94	0,347	-1,06	0,288	1,10	0,272	-1,68	0,093	0,43	0,666									
A sat.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod iii	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	13,38	0,000	0,16	-3,39	0,001	0,82	0,412	1,29	0,199	0,94	0,350	-1,51	0,131									
A sat.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	Consc.	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	14,38	0,000	0,17	-1,58	0,114	-0,20	0,839	0,65	0,514	0,79	0,432	0,01	0,991									
A comm.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod i	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	8,88	0,000	0,11	1,33	0,183	-2,67	0,008	-0,43	0,667	-1,47	0,142	1,75	0,080									
A comm.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod ii	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	9,30	0,000	0,12	0,80	0,422	-2,73	0,007	-0,39	0,695	-0,70	0,483	1,78	0,075									
A comm.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod iii	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	8,51	0,000	0,11	-0,31	0,754	-1,33	0,184	-0,31	0,753	0,32	0,752	0,23	0,817									
A comm.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	Consc.	6,717	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	10,22	0,000	0,13	0,65	0,514	1,96	0,050	3,78	0,000	-0,64	0,521	-2,39	0,017									
A comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod i	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	7,82	0,000	0,10	0,17	0,868	-0,31	0,760	0,81	0,418	-0,25	0,804	-0,28	0,777									
A comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod ii	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	8,34	0,000	0,10	-0,39	0,697	-0,24	0,812	0,99	0,324	0,47	0,638	-0,37	0,710									
A comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod iii	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	8,30	0,000	0,10	-1,75	0,080	1,28	0,201	0,83	0,409	1,79	0,074	-2,06	0,040									
A comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	Consc.	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	8,89	0,000	0,11	0,77	0,440	0,96	0,339	3,05	0,002	-0,81	0,416	-1,14	0,254									
A int. stay	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod i	6,711	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	21,94	0,000	0,24	-0,06	0,953	-1,31	0,189	3,01	0,003	-1,65	0,100	0,04	0,966									
A int. stay	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod ii	6,711	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	19,06	0,000	0,21	-1,74	0,083	-1,98	0,048	-0,07	0,948	-0,42	0,674	0,38	0,702									
A int. stay	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C mod iii	6,711	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	19,72	0,000	0,22	-3,00	0,003	-0,98	0,327	-0,59	0,554	0,61	0,543	-0,78	0,433									
A int. stay	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	Consc.	6,711	37,33	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,713	20,75	0,000	0,23	-0,93	0,352	0,60	0,549	2,32	0,021	0,25	0,802	-1,19	0,236									
A int. stay	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod i	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	21,01	0,000	0,23	0,65	0,519	-2,03	0,043	2,71	0,007	-2,19	0,029	1,27	0,206									
A int. stay	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod ii	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	17,84	0,000	0,20	-1,75	0,080	-0,88	0,379	0,33	0,742	0,05	0,964	-0,23	0,820									
A int. stay	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C mod iii	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	18,48	0,000	0,21	-3,11	0,002	0,01	0,991	-0,60	0,552	1,19	0,236	-1,31	0,190									
A int. stay	C pcb (global)	C pcv	Consc.	6,718	87,77	0,000	0,42	21,88	0,000	10,714	19,01	0,000	0,21	-0,45	0,652	0,01	0,993	1,81	0,071	-0,13	0,900	-0,34	0,735									

* Effects are only given for significant effects: where p < .05
 ** Effects are only given for significant effects: where the confidence interval excludes 0

Mod i = non-availability of attractive employment alternatives
 mod ii = procedural justice
 mod iii = justification for violation

Table 9: Tests for moderated mediation

DV	IV	Med	Mod	Regression 1						Regression 2										Conditional direct effect* at percentiles:					Conditional indirect effect** at percentiles:							
				Model summary				IV-Med		Model summary				Med-DV		IV-DV		Mod-DV												(med*mod) - DV		(IV*mod) - DV
				df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	df1 - df2	F	p	R ²	t	p	t	p	t	p	t	p	t	p	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	10th	25th	50th	75th
A comm.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A tenure	6,716	24,81	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,713	17,02	0,000	0,19	-3,52	0,001	-4,38	0,000	1,34	0,180	0,17	0,864	0,00	0,997									
A comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A tenure	7,717	84,55	0,000	0,41	21,83	0,000	10,713	15,30	0,000	0,18	-2,86	0,004	-2,39	0,017	2,32	0,021	0,95	0,344	-1,20	0,229									
C comm.	A pcb (weight.)	A pcv	A tenure	6,716	24,81	0,000	0,17	11,27	0,000	10,713	3,99	0,000	0,05	-0,31	0,761	-2,65	0,008	0,73	0,465	-0,60	0,548	0,20	0,839									
C comm.	A pcb (global)	A pcv	A tenure	7,717	84,55	0,000	0,41	21,83	0,000	10,713	2,98	0,001	0,04	-0,57	0,572	-0,91	0,363	0,67	0,505	-0,73	0,465	0,48	0,632									
C comm.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C tenure	6,716	37,35	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,712	13,97	0,000	0,16	-4,43	0,000	-5,24	0,000	-0,92	0,357	0,91	0,365	0,59	0,558									
C comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C tenure	6,717	87,67	0,000	0,42	21,86	0,000	10,713	12,35	0,000	0,15	-4,02	0,000	-3,34	0,001	0,30	0,768	1,78	0,076	-1,06	0,289									
A comm.	C pcb (weight.)	C pcv	C tenure	6,716	37,35	0,000	0,24	13,71	0,000	10,712	9,07	0,000	0,11	1,21	0,226	-3,75	0,000	0,57	0,566	-2,23	0,026	2,09	0,037									
A comm.	C pcb (global)	C pcv	C tenure	6,717	87,67	0,000	0,42	21,86	0,000	10,713	7,99	0,000	0,10	0,16	0,870	-1,22	-1,217	1,60	0,110	-0,65	0,513	-0,79	0,427									

* Effects are only given for significant effects: where p < .05
 ** Effects are only given for significant effects: where the confidence interval excludes 0