When Doves Fly High and Hawks Lay Low:
The Effects of Constituency Composition on Representative Negotiation

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Abstract

Research has shown that competitive (hawkish) minorities are relatively more persuasive than cooperative (dovish) ones in representative negotiation. The current study extended this previous research by examining the differential effects on integrative negotiation of hawkish versus dovish minorities with high or low status. An experiment (N=43) manipulated composition of the constituency across dyads: the majority was either hawkish or dovish, and the minority had a low or a high status. The effect that hawkish minorities have a disproportionate influence is replicated. However, lowering the status of the hawkish minority was able to diminish this effect and led to high negotiation outcomes and positive perceptions of the representative about his constituency and the negotiation in general. We conclude that perceived intragroup conflict plays an important role in lowering the negotiation outcomes, and hawkish messages receive more weight than dovish messages, even though representatives remember both kinds of messages equally well. Suggestions for future research on identifying more moderating factors and on exploring the exact mechanism underlying the disproportionate influence effect are discussed.

Key Words: Representative Negotiation, Homogeneous or Heterogeneous, Status, Constituency, Intergroup conflict, Intragroup Conflict, Social Influence
Intergroup conflicts are pervasive social phenomena that take place at different levels in society. Examples include ethnic conflicts, labor-management disputes or interstate war. Often, conflicting groups try to solve their conflicts through negotiation, which can be defined as the communication between two or more parties with divergent interests in order to reach an agreement (Pruitt, 1981). Such between-group negotiations are interesting, because oftentimes, the conflict contains integrative potential and allows for so-called win-win solutions. Integrative potential refers to a situation in which the most valuable issues for the one party are not necessarily also the most valuable for the other party (De Dreu, 2010). By engaging in information exchange and logrolling behavior (trading losses on less important issues for gains on more important issues), a high quality integrative agreement can be reached (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). If integrative agreements are reached, intergroup relations are likely to thrive and prosper, to yield economic and social benefits that cannot be reached through continuous fight and hostile exchange (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).

Whereas sometimes intergroup negotiations involve both opposing groups in their entirety, more often do groups engage a representative to negotiate on their behalf. They do so for several reasons, for example because it is hard to bring all group members together, because the representative has specific knowledge and expertise, or because the group cannot reach consensus about their preferred strategy (De Dreu, 2010). The key question addressed here is how within-constituency dynamics affect representatives’ integrative negotiation. We focused in particular on the effects of the proportions of competitive and cooperative factions and their relative status, on such intergroup negotiation. In doing so, we build on, and expand, research and theory on representative negotiation that mostly considers single-issues, distributive settings and, more importantly, assumed the constituency to be a monolithic entity that speaks with one voice.
Literature Review

Representative negotiation in general has received much research attention, showing for example that the outcomes of a representative negotiation are generally more competitive than a negotiation between individuals (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). This is in line with the ‘discontinuity effect’, a consistent research finding that in a negotiation situation, groups are more competitive or less cooperative than individuals. Groups justify their competitiveness in terms of protecting and helping their in-group (the negotiation team or constituency) against the out-group (the other party) (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003, & Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Such increased distrust in intergroup settings is problematic because it undermines information exchange and logrolling behavior that is needed to achieve win-win solutions. Indeed, research has consistently shown that a high quality negotiation is achieved when negotiators adopt a cooperative rather than a competitive orientation to the negotiation (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993. For a review, see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

Although representative negotiation is in general more competitive than interpersonal negotiation, the motivational orientation adopted by the representative is greatly influenced by the constituencies’ preferred strategy. Representatives negotiate in a more competitive way with their opponent when their constituency values competition. When they value cooperation however, representatives will adopt a more cooperative negotiation strategy (Druckman, 1994; Gelfand & Realo, 1998).

In sum, previous research has shown the importance of a cooperative negotiation style to reach a win-win solution and how representatives’ style depends on their constituencies’ voice. Thus, to reach a high quality agreement, representatives’ constituency needs to prefer a cooperative negotiation strategy. However, negotiating groups are rarely unitary but often
have conflicting interests on different dimensions, for example on the strategy they would like the representative to use and the agreement they want to reach (Halevy, 2008). This raises the questions if, when and why different factions favoring either a cooperative (‘dovish’) or competitive (‘hawkish’) approach are heard by the representative.

Some initial insight into the effects of the presence of hawkish and dovish factions within the constituency was recently provided by Steinel et al. (2009). These authors manipulated the composition of the constituency so that it consisted of either a minority of hawkish and a majority of dovish group members, or vice versa. Constituency members sent messages to the representatives about their preferred negotiation strategy (for example ‘Don’t negotiate too tough, otherwise we’ll regret it later’ favoring a cooperative and ‘Negotiate tough, otherwise we pay more than necessary’ favoring a competitive approach). The representative had to take these messages into account as the constituency would evaluate the quality of the final agreement. Across three experiments, Steinel et al. found hawkish minorities to have a disproportionate influence on representative’s concession making: when the group consisted of a majority of doves and a minority of hawks, representatives were significantly less cooperative than when the group consisted of doves only. The other way around, when the constituency contained a dovish minority, representatives were as tough as they were when the constituency contained hawks only. Clearly, a hawkish minority received more attention than a dovish minority, which was ignored. Accordingly, Steinel et al. suggest that hawkish messages are more attention grabbing than dovish messages.

Two possible explanations are discussed. This attention-grabbing could be a basic perception effect of negativity: hawkish messages automatically grab more attention. When the importance of the messages is increased, they should thus grab more attention, regardless of whether they are hawkish or dovish.
Another explanation is that this effect is more strategic: hawkish messages may receive more weight because a competitive approach can be justified in terms of in-group defense (competitive weighting), similar to the explanation of the previously discussed discontinuity effect. In this case, the influence of hawkish messages could possible be diminished by decreasing their importance, while it will be hard to increase the importance of the dovish messages since they will be overruled by the hawks by this strategic explanation.

The current study will try to disentangle these possible explanations by manipulating the status of the minority message. When a message has a higher status, it will be perceived as more important and thus receive more weight. The choice of the factor status is based on Social Impact Theory, which suggests a number of factors that contribute to the influence one party has over another. According to this theory, Social Impact is a function of strength (defined as status, power and knowledge), immediacy (proximity in space and time) and number of group members (Latané, 1981). This theory thus provides opportunities to compensate for the lack of impact due to a low number of group members on another dimension, for example on status. In line with the theory, previous research has shown individuals to be more responsive to minority influence when they perceive the influence agent to have high rather than low status (Ng & Van Dyne, 2001); the same should apply to representative’s negotiation behavior. The current research will investigate how manipulating the minority status can moderate the relative effects of hawkish and dovish majorities on representative’s negotiation behavior.

Furthermore, although the work by Steinel et al. (2009) provides an important first step to discover the dynamics of within-constituency conflict and their effects on negotiation, it raises some other questions. Firstly, Steinel et al. did not investigate a real representative negotiation. Instead, they made representatives of a group negotiate with a simulated individual. Furthermore, the negotiation was about one distributive issue, on which the
negotiators had competing interests, and essentially looked at concession making against a pre-programmed counterpart. As such, the study says little about the extent to which within-constituency disagreement influences the representatives’ ability to craft mutually beneficial, integrative agreements. The current study will thus research the dynamics between constituency composition and the extent to which agreements are integrative or distributive.

The current study

As shown by Steinel et al. (2009), a hawkish minority has a disproportionate influence on the representative’s concession making, possibly because hawkish messages receive more weight. However, when the status of these minority messages would be low, it seems likely that they will be considered less influential and receive less attention compared to when they are high. Accordingly, we predicted that representatives are more cooperative with their partner when their constituency is dovish rather than hawkish, but only when the hawkish minority in the dovish constituency has low rather than high status. Such higher cooperation should manifest itself in higher joint outcomes (hypothesis 1).

To further investigate the underlying mechanisms of this effect, representatives’ perceptions of the negotiation will be assessed. Assumptions are that representatives will evaluate the negotiation more favorably and use more cooperative styles when their constituency is predominantly dovish rather than hawkish.

Representatives’ perceptions of their constituency will be investigated as well. A constituency of mainly doves is likely to be considered more cooperative than a constituency of mainly hawks. However, the status of the hawkish minority is expected to affect these perceptions similar to its hypothesized effect on the integrative agreement: Representatives will thus perceive their constituency as more cooperative when their
constituency is predominantly dovish rather than hawkish, especially when the hawkish minority has low rather than high status (*hypothesis 2*).

In a similar vein, the disproportionate effect of the hawkish minority is expected to show in the perceived heterogeneity of the constituency such that hawkish messages with high status grab more attention than the low status ones, while the less attention-grabbing dovish messages are overlooked. Thus, dovish messages will be ignored and the constituency will be perceived as more homogeneous when the majority is hawkish. The other way around, the constituency is expected to be perceived as more heterogeneous when the majority is dovish rather than hawkish, especially when the hawkish minority has high status (*hypothesis 3*).

Finally, processes through which this disproportionate influence operates will be investigated. Expectations about the preferred negotiation outcome from a homogeneous constituency are expected to be clearer for the representative than messages received from a heterogeneous constituency. Constituencies’ expectations will therefore be clearer to the representative when the constituency consists of a majority of hawks. Furthermore, in case of a dovish minority, these expectations will be clearer when the hawkish minority has a low rather than a high status (*hypothesis 4*). Representatives will be more able to disregard the hawkish message when this member has low status.

Another process possibly determining how the representative responds to his constituencies’ messages is the trust that his constituency will approve his agreement. In line with the competitive weighting explanation that even when the negotiation style is competitive, this can still be explained to the cooperative constituency members as an in-group defense strategy, representative’s will worry less that the dovish majority will refute their negotiated agreement, whether cooperative or competitive. Thus, it is predicted that representatives have more trust that their agreement will be approved when the majority of their constituency is dovish rather than hawkish, especially if the hawkish minority has low status (*hypothesis 5*). In
the case of a dovish majority and a hawkish minority with high status, more intragroup conflict will be experienced and therefore less certainty that the agreement will be accepted by the constituency.

Furthermore, representatives’ motivation and ability to fulfill the wishes of the constituency will be discussed. It is likely that motivation and ability will have different effects, since motivation does not have to be a result of the type of message. Thus, constituency composition is predicted not to influence representative’s motivation to fulfill the constituencies’ wishes (hypothesis 6a). Representatives’ ability to fulfill the wishes of the constituency however, is expected to differ across conditions. Dovish wishes can be fulfilled more easily because they are less demanding. However, this applies only if there is no perceived subgroup conflict between hawks and doves. Accordingly, hypothesis 6b states that representatives will feel better able to fulfill the wishes of their constituency when it consists of a dovish majority, and the hawkish minority status is low rather than high.

Lastly, the current study will more thoroughly investigate whether the disproportionate effect of hawks may be explained by the basic perception process. In this case, enhancing the status of the minority will increase their importance both for dovish and for hawkish messages. This has implications for all of the above described hypotheses: instead of interaction effects, additive effects of minority status will show for all discussed dependent variables: When dovish (hawkish) minority status is high, this will enhance (decrease) joint outcomes, perceived cooperativeness, perceived trust that the agreement will be approved and perceived ability to fulfill constituencies’ wishes while it will decrease (enhance) perceived homogeneity and clarity of expectations.

Furthermore, if the disproportionate influence is due to a basic perception effect, representatives will remember hawkish messages more correctly than dovish ones, because they pay more attention to them. Also, they will remember high status messages better than
low status ones. Hypothesis 7 will investigate whether representatives recall hawkish and high
status messages better than dovish and low status ones.

Alternatively, if the representatives pay as much attention to the dovish as to the
hawkish messages but still use them differently in their subsequent negotiation decisions, they
should be able to recall messages of both natures to a similar extent. If this is the case, other,
more strategic considerations such as the competitive weighting explanation as suggested by
Steinel et al. can provide a better explanation for the disproportionate influence effect. A
preliminary idea of these possible strategic considerations will be revealed by investigating the
processes as described in hypothesis 4 – 6.

The design of the current study will be similar to the design used by Steinel et al.: Next
to receiving messages from their constituency, being either cooperative (dovish) or
competitive (hawkish) representatives will receive information about the status of the minority
group member. Subsequently, they will negotiate during an interactive chat program and
afterwards fill out their agreement and a questionnaire measuring their perceptions and
processes during the negotiation.
Method

Participants and Design

Eighty-six undergraduate students (43 dyads) from the University of Amsterdam (30 male, Mean age = 21.66, SD = 3.87) participated for either course credit or € 7. The design was a 2 x 2 factorial with composition of constituency (majority hawkish vs. majority dovish) and minority status (high vs. low) as the between-dyad independent variables. Participants were randomly assigned to dyads and dyads were randomly assigned to the four conditions. Different gender composition of dyads did not affect the dependent variables and will not be discussed further.

Negotiation Task

Participants received instructions about a computer-mediated negotiation between the representatives of the management and the union of an international organization about the new collective employment contract. (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Participants took the role of the representatives and had to reach agreement on five issues: salary, start date of the new employment contract, duration of the new employment contract, the upcoming salary increase and the coverage of health insurance. They received a pay-off schedule (as shown in the Appendix) with possible agreements and the value of those agreements in points. Priorities among these issues differ between the representatives: four issues have integrative potential, and one (salary) is a distributive issue. Participants were instructed that they had 15 minutes to negotiate and they had to gain as many points as possible. They were reinforced to reach an agreement within time and to follow the instructions of their constituency (see below) by the possibility of earning €30 if their constituency would accept their agreement and it would be the best agreement among all participants. The maximum individual outcome per representative was 1290 points, the
highest possible joint outcome was 810 points for each representative. A fifty-fifty compromise on each issue would result in 577 points. This value was assigned to the members of two dyads who failed to reach an agreement within time. To ensure that participants understood the instructions, they were provided with several examples of outcomes and with an exercise question about the points they would gain in case of a given agreement. Subsequently, they negotiated for a maximum of 15 minutes using a chat program. Afterwards, they filled out their agreement and completed a post-negotiation questionnaire (see below).

**Procedure and Independent Variables: Constituency Composition and Minority Status**

Upon arrival in the lab, participants were seated in front of a computer. They read on the screen that the experiment would consist of two parts: a negotiation part on behalf of their constituency consisting of four people that had come to the lab earlier, and a task to measure their visuality, a bogus personality trait. They were told that visuality is an important personality trait, related to success in one’s career, leadership positions and status. First, participants received the visuality scores of their group members, which they were instructed to remember because these could possibly be helpful in the visuality task. Constituency member C had a deviant score on visuality: either very high (73) or very low (27) compared to the other members who all scored around the average of 50. This was the status manipulation.

Subsequently, participants were told that the negotiation task would take place first, before the actual visuality task. They read the instructions as described in the previous section. Composition of the constituency was manipulated by providing the participants with fake messages from their constituents, who supposedly left these messages for them. In the majority hawkish condition, three members sent a competitive message and one member (C, who also had a deviating visuality score) sent a message suggesting a cooperative approach. In the majority dovish condition, this was reversed, so that member C sent a competitive message
while the messages of the other constituency members favored a cooperative approach. The messages are shown in Table 1. As an incentive for the representatives to pay attention to these messages, they were told that they could earn an additional amount of €30 as discussed previously.

**Dependent Variables**

The main dependent variable was the joint outcome of the agreement, obtained by summing the points of the representatives on the negotiation agreement within each dyad. The post-negotiation questionnaire included manipulation check items and additional variables.

To investigate whether the status manipulation had worked, participants were asked to recall the visuality scores of their constituency members. To check the constituency composition manipulation, participants were provided with messages and had to indicate whether this was one of the messages they had seen before.

Other questions in the questionnaire aimed to measure underlying perceptions of the negotiation in general and of the constituency in particular and underlying processes in the negotiation. Perceptions of the negotiation were measured by a scale with two items, asking how easy vs. difficult and how relaxed vs. tense the negotiation was perceived.

Perceived negotiation style of the representative, a higher score indicating a more competitive style, was measured by six items (example items: ‘During the negotiation, I tried to gain more points than the other’, ‘During the negotiation, I tried to take the other into account as well (reverse coded)).

Perceptions of constituents’ group norm were measured by items about the *perceived cooperativeness* by the representative of the constituency during the negotiation (Six items, examples being: ‘My constituency wanted me to make concessions’; ‘my constituency wanted me to be cooperative’; adapted from Steinel et al., 2009). Representative’s perceived
heterogeneity of the constituency was measured by three items, example item ‘There were contradicting opinions in the group’, adapted from Steinel et al., 2009).

To gain insight in underlying processes and motivations of the representatives, a question about representative’s perception of the constituency’s expectations (‘It was clear what my constituency expected me to do’), three questions about representative’s trust that the constituents would accept their decision (example item ‘I think my constituency will accept my agreement’), five questions about representative’s motivation to negotiate according to the wishes of their constituency (examples being ‘I wanted to make a deal that my constituency would approve’, ‘I wanted to make a deal my constituency would approve’), and two questions about representative’s perceptions of their ability to negotiate according to the wishes of their constituency (example item ‘I had difficulties doing what my constituency wanted’) were posed. All statements were rated on a seven point scale, with 1 = ‘completely disagree’ to 7 = ‘completely agree’.

Finally, to test whether the expected effect that hawks have a disproportionate influence is driven by a basic perception effect, participants had to indicate whether they had seen 16 competitive and cooperative messages before and if so, how likely it would be that each of their constituency members had left this message.

Dyads were used as the level of analysis because individual answers to the questions could be influenced by the interaction with the negotiation partner. For all the analyses, answers of the two dyad members were aggregated.
Results

Descriptives

Table 2 shows the correlations, means and standard deviations of the measured variables. Several of these correlations are significant: When representatives’ perceive their constituents to be more cooperative, they not only reach higher joint outcomes, but also perceive the negotiation more positively, use less avoiding strategies during the negotiation and use a less competitive negotiation style. In a similar vein, negative negotiation perceptions are related to a more competitive and more avoiding negotiation style. Finally, when representatives have clear expectations of what the constituency wants, they are more motivated to meet them.

Manipulation checks

To investigate whether participants correctly recalled that constituency member C had a lower or higher (depending on condition) score on visuality than the other constituency members, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with the recalled visuality score of each of the four group members as dependent variables. In the high status condition, the visuality score of member C was higher than in the low status condition ($M_{\text{high}} = 71.64$, $SD_{\text{high}} = 7.26$, $M_{\text{low}} = 29.89$, $SD_{\text{low}} = 5.38$, $F(1, 39) = 446.00$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .951$). The scores of the other members did not differ between the conditions (Member A: $F(1, 39) = .02$, $p = .90$, $\eta^2 = .001$; Member B: $F(1, 39) = 1.178$, $p = .289$, $\eta^2 = .049$; Member C: $F(1, 39) = .799$, $p = .371$, $\eta^2 = .034$). The status manipulation is considered successful.

Two simple ANOVA’s were performed to assess differences in condition (majority hawkish versus majority dovish) in estimated likelihood that one of the members had left this message. For the cooperative messages, the likelihood that one of the constituency members had left this message was estimated higher in the majority dovish condition ($F(1, 39) = 70.86$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .634$).
likelihood was estimated higher in the majority hawkish condition \( (F(1, 39) = 22.767, p < .001, \eta^2 = .487) \) than in the majority dovish condition. This suggests that the constituency composition (dovish vs hawkish) manipulation was successful.

**Joint outcomes**

Hypothesis 1 predicted that outcomes would be the highest when the majority of the constituency members would be dovish, but only if the hawkish minority would have a low status. A 2 (constituency composition: Majority hawkish vs. majority dovish) \( \times \) 2 (status of minority: high or low) ANOVA on joint outcome revealed the expected interaction effect \( (F(1, 39) = 4.43, p = .04, \eta^2 = .102) \). For a graphical representation and means and standard deviations, see figure 3. Simple effects showed that dyads reached higher joint outcomes when the majority of the constituency members is cooperative and the minority has a high status versus a low status \( (F(1, 39) = 6.824, p = .01, \eta^2 = .149) \). Similarly, higher joint outcomes were reached when the status of the minority was low and the majority of the constituency was cooperative compared to competitive \( (F(1, 39) = 4.827, p = .034, \eta^2 = .110) \). When the majority consisted of hawks, the status of the dovish minority did not matter, as expected. Thus, hypothesis 1 was confirmed.

**Perceptions of negotiation**

On the remaining variables, several 2 (composition constituency: majority hawkish or majority dovish) \( \times \) 2 (status minority: high or low) ANOVA’s were performed. As expected, a main effect of constituency emerged for the negotiation perceptions: Dyads with a dovish majority in their constituency perceived the negotiation as less tense and less difficult \( (M = 2.63, SD = 1.18) \) than dyads with a hawkish majority in their constituency \( (M = 3.86, SD = \)
1.24; \( F(1, 39) = 9.392, p = .004, \eta^2 = .222 \) and the negotiation style of the dyads was perceived to be more competitive when the constituency consisted of a hawkish majority (M = 4.24, SD = .51) compared to a dovish majority (M = 3.69, SD = .70; \( F(1, 39) = 3.712, p = .011, \eta^2 = .171 \)).

**Perceptions of constituency**

Hypothesis 2 stated that dyads would perceive their constituency as most cooperative when the majority of the constituency would be dovish, and the hawkish minority would have a low rather than high status. A 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed that the perceived cooperativeness of the constituency by the representatives was higher when the majority of the constituency consisted of doves (M = 4.69, SD = .67) rather than hawks (M = 2.76, SD = .63; \( F(1, 39) = 96.159, p < .001, \eta^2 = .745 \)). This main effect was qualified by an interaction similar to the one found in hypothesis 1: When the majority of the constituency was dovish, the perceived cooperativeness was higher when the status of the hawkish minority was low rather than high (\( F(1, 39) = 5.910, p = .021, \eta^2 = .152 \)). Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 3. Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed.

The perceived heterogeneity of the constituency was expected to be higher when the constituency would consist of a dovish versus a hawkish majority, especially when the hawkish minority would have high status (hypothesis 3). A 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed a trend in this expected direction: When the majority of the group was cooperative, the dyads experienced less agreement within their constituency (M = 2.82, SD = .62) than when the majority of the group was competitive (M = 3.33, SD = .92, \( F(1, 39) = 3.71, p = .062, \eta^2 = .096 \)). No interaction effect was found (\( F(1, 39) < 1, ns, \eta^2 = .00 \)). Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Processes in negotiation

A 2 X 2 ANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of constituency composition and status on the clarity of constituents’ expectations for the representative. A main effect of constituency emerged: When the constituency was composed of a majority of hawks, their expectations were clearer (M = 5.10, SD = 1.08) to the representatives compared to when the constituency was composed of a majority of doves (M = 4.28, SD = .98; F (1, 39) = 7.63, p = .009, $\eta^2 = .171$). There was also a main effect of status, in such a way that the expectations of the constituency were clearer when the minority member had a low (M = 5.17, SD = .91) rather than a high status (M = 4.20, SD = 1.08; F (1, 39) = 10.75, p = .002, $\eta^2 = .225$). Although this is not the interaction effect as predicted in hypothesis 4, it is in the expected direction and similar to the pattern obtained for joint outcomes and perceived cooperativeness.

Hypothesis 5 stated that dyads with a dovish majority in their constituency would have more trust that their negotiated outcome would be approved than dyads with a hawkish majority in their constituency, especially when the hawkish minority would have a low rather than high status. This hypothesis was confirmed by a 2 X 2 ANOVA with trust as dependent variable ($F (1, 39) = 4.176, p = .049, \eta^2 = .112$). Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 3. Simple effect analysis showed the nature of the interaction: when status of the minority member was low, representatives with a dovish majority in their constituency had more trust than representatives with a hawkish majority in their constituency ($F (1, 39) = 4.50, p = .042, \eta^2 = .120$). No difference between the constituencies was found when status of the minority member was high.

The motivation of the representatives to fulfill the wishes of their constituency was not expected to differ depending on constituency composition (hypothesis 6a). Their ability to fulfill this wishes however, was expected to be higher when the majority of the constituency
would consist of doves, but only if the minority would have a low status (hypothesis 6b). A 2 X 2 ANOVA with motivation as dependent variable did not result in a significant difference between constituencies ($F(1, 39) = .973, p = .331, \eta^2 = .029$), supporting hypothesis 6a. For representatives’ ability, a pattern similar to the pattern observed for joint outcomes, perceived cooperativeness and trust, emerged ($F(1, 39) = 5.13, p = .030, \eta^2 = .134$). Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 3. Simple effect analyses revealed the exact nature of the interaction effect: Representatives with a dovish majority in their constituency are better able to fulfill the wishes of their constituents than representatives with a hawkish majority in the constituency when the status of the minority member is low ($F(1, 39) = 3.803, p = .06, \eta^2 = .103$). Similarly, representatives are better able to fulfill their constituencies wishes when the status of the minority member is low rather than high when the majority of the constituency is dovish ($F(1, 39) = 3.803, p = .06, \eta^2 = .103$). These findings support hypothesis 6b.

Finally, the basic perception hypothesis (hypothesis 7) was explored. Participants had to indicate the likelihood that each of their constituency members had left a certain message. This was assessed using two repeated measures ANOVA’s with the composition of the constituency (majority hawkish versus majority dovish) and status of the minority member (high or low) as independent variable, nature of the messages as dependent variable and group member as within subjects factor. For the cooperative messages, the constituency with a dovish majority estimated the likelihood that member A ($F(1, 39) = 15.915, p = .001, \eta^2 = .399$), B ($F(1, 39) = 21.970, p = .000, \eta^2 = .478$) or D ($F(1, 39) = 28.739, p = .000, \eta^2 = .545$) left this message as bigger than the constituency with a hawkish majority, who estimated the likelihood that C ($F(1, 39) = 57.052, p = .000, \eta^2 = .704$) left this message as bigger compared to the constituency with a dovish majority. No effect of status was found ($F(1, 39) = .120, ns, \eta^2 = .004$).
The reversed pattern emerged for the competitive messages: Participants with a hawkish majority estimated the likelihood that member A \((F (1, 39) = 38.928, p = .000, \eta^2 = .619)\), B \((F (1, 39) = 45.131, p = .000, \eta^2 = .653)\) or D \((F (1, 39) = 68.472, p = .000, \eta^2 = .740)\) would have left this message as bigger than participants with a dovish majority, while participants with a dovish majority estimated the likelihood that member C \((F (1, 39) = 15.681, p = .001, \eta^2 = .395)\) would have left this message as bigger than participants with a hawkish majority. Again, status of the minority member did not influence this effect \((F (1, 39) = 1.302, ns, \eta^2 = .044)\). A graphical representation can be found in figure 2 and 3.

Thus, no difference was found in correct recall of dovish versus hawkish messages, and no interaction with status was found, indicating that representatives recalled these messages equally well. The basic perception hypothesis (hypothesis 7) cannot be confirmed: Apparently, representatives do pay attention to the dovish messages and remember them, whether they are in the minority or not and regardless of their status, yet they do not seem to weigh them equally to the hawkish messages in their subsequent negotiation behavior.
Discussion

Intergroup conflicts occur very often in everyday life. To solve conflicts, representatives often negotiate on behalf of a group. Although both interpersonal and intergroup conflict and negotiation has been researched extensively, research has only sparsely looked at the influence of within-constituency conflict on the negotiation outcome. The current research extends previous work by Steinel et al., who found that hawkish minority factions have more influence than dovish minority factions on concession making behavior. We investigated, based on Social Impact Theory, the moderating role of minority status on this effect. Furthermore, representatives’ perceptions of the negotiation, their constituency, and processes through which they negotiated provided further insight in the reasons underlying this effect. Additionally, the current study was a first to investigate effects of within-constituency conflict on a real representative negotiation with integrative potential.

Steinel et al. suggested competitive weighting as explanation for the disproportionate influence effect. This refers to hawkish messages receiving more weight in the negotiation than dovish ones, presumably because doves will be easier to convince to agree with a competitive agreement which can be explained in terms of in-group defense. This hypothesis extends the explanation for the discontinuity effect which shows that groups are generally more competitive than individuals in a negotiation. A possible alternative explanation addressed in the current study was a basic perception effect: hawkish messages grab more attention than dovish ones, will be remembered better and therefore receive more weight in the negotiation agreement. In this case should enhancing the status of the minority member result in more perceived attention and thus in more influence in the negotiation, whether this minority is hawkish or dovish should not matter. However, this explanation was not supported by our results: Representatives’ remembered both hawkish and dovish messages equally well and enhancing the status of the dovish minority did not affect any of our measures. The
disproportionate influence of a hawkish minority cannot be explained by the basic perception effect. This leaves the competitive weighting hypothesis as a valid alternative.

In line with the competitive weighing explanation, we found status of the hawkish minority to be a moderator in several cases. The integrative agreement was of higher quality when the majority was dovish rather than hawkish, but only if this hawkish minority had low status. In a similar vein, representatives perceived their constituency as more cooperative by the representative when it was predominantly dovish instead of hawkish, especially when the hawkish minority had low status. Furthermore, representatives’ felt more able to fulfill the wishes of the constituency when it consisted of a dovish majority, again especially when the hawkish minority had low status.

These effects support the competitive weighting hypothesis: Hawks have a disproportionate influence, even when they are in the minority and can thus block positive outcomes. However, when the status of the hawkish minority decreases, they accordingly have less influence in the negotiation process and receive less weight, leading to better outcomes. Manipulating the status of the dovish minority did not have an effect, they were overruled by the hawkish majority. This is in line with the notion that it is easier for representatives to justify competitive rather than cooperative negotiation behavior to their own constituency when this experiences intragroup conflict, namely in terms of ingroup defense.

We furthermore found that regardless of status, representatives’ with a predominantly hawkish constituency perceived this constituency as more homogeneous and felt that their expectations about the preferred negotiation approach were clearer. Both of these effects can be explained in terms of perceived intragroup conflict: When the minority of the constituency is dovish, their voice is ignored by the representative and the constituency, consisting of a hawkish majority, is perceived to be more unitary compared to when the majority is dovish and the minority hawkish.
Previous research on the effects of intragroup conflict in a between group negotiation by Halevy (2008) showed that intragroup conflict resulted in lower quality negotiation outcomes and more negative negotiation perceptions. Current findings confirm this previous work: less perceived intragroup conflict (status of hawkish minority was low) had a positive effect on representatives’ perceptions and the quality of the agreement. Less intragroup conflict was also experienced when the majority of the constituency was hawkish. This however did not result in better outcomes since the representatives of this constituency adopted a competitive approach, known to result in lower quality negotiation perception and agreements (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

Our study firstly replicated the disproportionate influence effect of hawkish messages, increasing the importance of research in the area of intragroup conflict and negotiation. It furthermore extended the work by Steinel et al. by investigating a real negotiation between representatives, focusing on a negotiation outcome with high integrative potential. This was a first step in revealing how within-constituency conflict affects intergroup conflict and negotiation and how the disproportionate influence effect of hawkish messages can be decreased.

An interesting avenue for future research would be to compare integrative agreements between representatives without a conflict in their constituency with representatives with constituencies as studied in the current research. We have shown that when the hawkish minority status is low, this leads to the highest negotiation outcomes. According to Halevy’s research (2008), this outcome should be similar or even lower to a no-constituency negotiation outcome, due to less perceived intra-group conflict and a cooperative negotiation preference. This implies that a constituency with a hawkish majority or a dovish majority and a hawkish minority with high status hinders the integrative potential in the agreement, rather than that a constituency with a dovish majority and a hawkish minority with low status stimulates this
integrative potential. Future research should point out whether this really applies, or whether representatives with constituencies composed in a certain, presumably dovish way can actually raise the integrative quality of the agreement above the quality generally achieved by a representative without a constituency.

Another line of future research could address a limitation in the current study: We mainly focused on perceptions and processes between the representative and his constituency, rather than on the interaction processes between representatives. Future studies should more thoroughly investigate how the representatives use the messages of their constituency in the intergroup negotiation and how they perceive the negotiation afterwards. Finally, the competitive weighting hypothesis could receive stronger support if the representative can argue why he negotiated in a certain way, and why he neglected the dovish messages, even though he remembered them equally well. This way, we could directly address our theory that representatives adopt the competitive approach because this approach can be justified both to the dovish and to the hawkish members of his constituency.

When more steps have been taken to identify other possible factors that can help decreasing or determining the disproportionate influence effect, a model could be build that provides insight into the dynamics of intra- and intergroup conflicts. This is of high practical relevance, since it is nearly unimaginable that conflicts between groups exist where all group members have the same interests and value the same strategies. Representatives should receive guidelines how to use the information provided by such a disagreeing constituency to get the highest possible agreement that will satisfy all group members. Solving the intragroup conflict is needed to prevent continuous dissatisfaction with the status quo which can lead to another escalation of intergroup conflict. Research such as the current will help to reveal information for the representative how to reach the goal of conflict resolution, both on intra- and intergroup level.
References


Table 1. The messages used in the experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group member</th>
<th>Majority hawkish, minority dovish:</th>
<th>Majority dovish, minority hawkish:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member A:</td>
<td>Try to get a good deal. The less we pay the better.</td>
<td>Try to get an honest deal. It doesn’t have to be free.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member B:</td>
<td>Don’t be too soft, that will benefit us the most</td>
<td>Don’t be too hard, that will benefit us the most</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member C:</td>
<td>Not all issues are equally important, we can give in here and there</td>
<td>We have to win this negotiation, on all issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member D:</td>
<td>Negotiate tough, otherwise we pay more than necessary</td>
<td>Don't negotiate too tough, otherwise we’ll regret it later</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Means, standard deviation, correlations and Cronbachs alpha of the dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Joint outcome</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.35*</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Neg. Perception</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.44*</td>
<td>.50*</td>
<td>-.51*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dutch Avoiding</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.43*</td>
<td>-.48*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Neg Style</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Perceived Coop.</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Perceived Hetero.</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.17</td>
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<td>7. Expectation</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8. Trust</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Motivation</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.11</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ability</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of perceived cooperativeness, trust and ability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Majority competitive</th>
<th>Majority cooperative</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M high status</td>
<td>M low status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perc. Coop.</td>
<td>2.86 (.59)</td>
<td>2.64 (.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>4.63 (.93)</td>
<td>4.04 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>4.15 (1.06)</td>
<td>3.67 (.73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Only when the constituency consists of a dovish majority and the hawkish minority has low status, high joint outcomes will be reached.
Figure 2. Different likelihood depending on constituency composition that each of the members left a cooperative message.
Figure 3. Different likelihood depending on constituency composition that each of the members left a competitive message.
Appendix

Pay-off schedule of the Union representative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Start contract</th>
<th>Duration contract</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Health Insurance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€ 14000 (00)</td>
<td>14 weeks (00)</td>
<td>0,5 year (00)</td>
<td>1% (00)</td>
<td>10% (00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 15000 (90)</td>
<td>12 weeks (60)</td>
<td>1,0 year (30)</td>
<td>2% (15)</td>
<td>20% (45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€ 16000 (180)</td>
<td>10 weeks (120)</td>
<td>1,5 year (60)</td>
<td>3% (30)</td>
<td>30% (90)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€ 17000 (270)</td>
<td>8 weeks (180)</td>
<td>2,0 year (90)</td>
<td>4% (45)</td>
<td>40% (135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 18000 (360)</td>
<td>6 weeks (240)</td>
<td>2,5 year (120)</td>
<td>5% (60)</td>
<td>50% (180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4 weeks (300)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>€ 20000 (540)</td>
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<td>7% (90)</td>
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Pay-off schedule of the management representative

<table>
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<th>Start contract</th>
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<tr>
<td>€ 14000 (540)</td>
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<td>1% (360)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6% (60)</td>
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<tr>
<td>€ 20000 (00)</td>
<td>2 weeks (00)</td>
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<td>7% (00)</td>
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